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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE
RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT OF 2000:
WILL RLUIPA'S STRICT SCRUTINY SURVIVE
THE SUPREME COURT'S STRICT SCRUTINY?
Caroline R. Adams*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2001, the Praise Christian Center moved into an
eighty-year-old warehouse in Huntington Beach, California.' After
installing a carpet, wiring, lights, and furniture, the congregation
began to hold Sunday morning services.2 But, in December 2001,
Huntington Beach officials ordered the church members out of the
warehouse, alleging that the church had not obtained the proper
permits.' Church Pastor Derek Anunciation claims that the cost of
obtaining the necessary permits is twice as much as the church can
afford.4 City officials also notified the church that zoning laws had
recently changed to allow only single-family homes in the area where
the warehouse is located.5
In Sierra Madre, California, Marantha High School, a non-
denominational Christian high school, purchased a sixty-three-acre
site to which it planned to relocate before September 2002, when its
current lease expires.6 In light of community concerns, however, the
school modified its original plans and ultimately proposed to build on
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Father Charles Whelan for his guidance and encouragement throughout the writing of
this Note. Many thanks also to John, Laurie, and Giorgio for all of their assistance.
1. Jim Hinch, Church Could Lose Its New Sanctuary, The Orange County Reg.,










8.5 acres with the remaining 54.5 acres to be preserved as open space.'
After two years of debate, on January 7, 2002, the Sierra Madre City
Council voted 3-1 to reject a zoning change that would have allowed
the school to be built.8
Meanwhile, in the town of Harrison, New York, a Mormon Church
is facing similar problems.' The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints has tried for more than five years to obtain a permit to build a
new temple in that township. ° According to its complaint filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the town
spent three-and-a-half years reviewing the Church's application, a
period that is about eight times longer than usual." When the
planning board finally approved the building plans, severe restrictions
on the Church's size accompanied the "approval," as did prohibitions
on operating a genealogy or visitor's center and on holding festivals
and pageants of any kind on the property."1
In recent years, debates of this kind have become common in the
United States. Zoning boards are perceived as notoriously
uncooperative. 3  But religious institutions feel especially
discriminated against in landmark and zoning decisions. 4 Some
zoning codes limit the construction of religious institutions to certain
districts, 5 and statistical evidence suggests that religious institutions,
and especially those of minority religions, are disproportionately
represented in zoning and landmark disputes.' 6
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Kent Larsen, LDS Church Files Civil Rights Lawsuit Against Harrison, New
York. Mormon News, Dec. 18, 2001, http://www.mormonstoday.com/011221/
NlHarrisonLawsuit0l.shtml; Karen Pasternack, Mormon Church Sues for Civil Rights
Violations, The J. News, Dec. 19, 2001, at http://www.thejoumalnews.com/newsroom/
121901/19mormon.html; see also The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Case
Summary, at http://www.rluipa.com/caseslLDS-Harrison.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2002).
10. Larsen, supra note 9.
11. Id. According to the complaint, the usual amount of time spent reviewing any
one application is five months. Id.
12. Id.
13. E.g., Tom Wolfe, The Bonfire of the Vanities 593 (1987) ("'Mort? You know
that church, St. Timothy's? ... Right... LANDMARK THE SON OF A BITCH!"').
14. E.g., Jane Lampman, Uneasy Neighbors: Religious Groups Find Cities Less
Hospitable on Zoning Matters, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 21, 2000, at 14 ("While
issues of building size and traffic are familiar local concerns, religious groups say the
problems they confront today are diverse: from zoning codes that favor secular over
religious uses, to discrimination against certain faiths, to exclusion of churches
altogether from land-use plans.").
15. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 474 (8th Cir.
1991) (upholding zoning code that excluded religious institutions from business
districts); Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699
F.2d 303, 309 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding zoning code that excluded religious
institutions from residential districts).
16. For example, a Brigham Young University study purports to show that
minority religions are vastly over-represented in zoning lawsuits. See infra note 145.
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Until recently, plaintiffs in these matters have relied on the Free
Exercise Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Free Speech Clause in
their battles against local government. Two years ago, however,
Congress provided religious institutions with a new weapon with
which to challenge zoning board decisions-the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA").'
Under RLUIPA, if a religious institution is able to show that the
denial of a zoning permit or variance "substantial[ly] burden[edI"11 its
free exercise of religion, the opposing city or town must demonstrate
that denying the necessary permit served a "'compelling governmental
interest."'2 Each city would also have to show that the denial was the
"least restrictive means" available to advance that interest.'2
The extent of the religious institutions' initial burden is governed by
RLUIPA's definition of "religious exercise," which "includes any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief."- In fact, RLUIPA specifically provides
that "[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for the
purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious
exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the
property for that purpose."' -  Thus, under RLUIPA, each of the
zoning issues detailed above would likely qualify as an issue of
"religious exercise. ' 24
In fact, RLUIPA was designed to address debates of this very
nature between zoning boards and religious institutions.--' In response
to lobbying by religious activists of various denominations, Congress
determined that discrimination against religious institutions had to be
According to Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. the Brigham Young study reveals "that a
minority religious group is over ten times more likely to need to file suit to gain
approval for erecting a religious building" than a large religious group. Sidley Austin
Brown & Wood's Religious Institutions Group and the RLUIPA Litigation Task
Force, Questions & Answers About the Federal Religious Land Use Law of 2000, at
3, http://vwwv.sidley.com/db30/cgibin/pubsAWeb%20version%20of%20RLUIPA %
20booklet.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002). This study informs the arguments of many
RLUIPA advocates who testified before Congress. See infra notes 145-54 and
accompanying text for more extensive discussion.
17. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc (2001).
18. RLUIPA is pronounced "'ar-loo-pa." For more information on RLUIPA, see
generally The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty's RLUIPA Home Page. which can
be found at http://www.rluipa.com.
19. RLUIPA, § 2(a)(1).
20. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A).
21. Id. § 2(a)(1)(B).
22. Id. § 8(7)(A).
23. Id § 8(7)(B).
24. Id.
25. Sidley Austin, supra note 16. at I ("RLUIPA is a law designed to protect
religious assemblies and institutions from zoning and historic landmark laws that
substantially interfere with their religious free exercise.").
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redressed, particularly in the zoning context.26 Accordingly, both the
Praise Christian Center and Marantha High School plan to rely in part
on RLUIPA in challenging the action taken by the zoning boards. 27
The Mormon Church has already filed a complaint in the Southern
District of New York, alleging that the zoning board violated its rights
under RLUIPA by substantially burdening its exercise of religion.28
Enacted in 2000, RLUIPA represents a scaled-down version of two
prior bills, the Religious Liberty Protection Acts of 199829 and 199930
("RLPA"), which were never enacted.3' It also shares several
common elements with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 ("RFRA"),32  which the Supreme Court found to be
unconstitutionally broad in City of Boerne v. Flores.3 In response to
criticism that the RLPA was also overly broad,3' Congress narrowed
considerably the proposed statute and passed RLUIPA in its stead. 5
RLUIPA seeks to combat infringement of the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause 36 in two specific areas. First, it protects the right
of individuals to gather and worship by treating the land use of
26. 146 Cong. Rec. H7191 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Charles T.
Canady) ("While this bill does not fill the gap in the legal protections available to
people of faith in every circumstance, it will provide critical protection in two
important areas where the right to religious exercise is frequently infringed.").
27. Chavez, supra note 6; Hinch, supra note 1.
28. Larsen, supra note 9.
29. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998).
30. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
31. 146 Cong. Rec. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Charles T.
Canady) (stating that RLIUPA "is patterned after an earlier, more expansive bill,
H.R. 1691, which passed the House of Representatives with an overwhelming vote
after several committee hearings, two markups, and the filing of a Committee
Report").
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-bb (1994), amended by Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, § 7,42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-4 (2001).
33. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
34. E.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings on H.R. 4019 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
41 (1998) [hereinafter Hamilton Testimony, 1998] (testimony of Marci Hamilton,
Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University) ("When I first
read The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, I thought someone was playing a
prank on me. If I had been commissioned to write a law post-Boerne v. Flores that
contains multiple constitutional violations, I could not have done a better job.");
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 2148 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 33 (1998) [hereinafter Eisgruber Testimony, 1998]
(testimony of Christopher L. Eisgruber, Professor, New York University School of
Law) (finding that the RLPA of 1998 "repeats and exacerbates the mistakes that led
eventually to the decision in Boerne that struck down RFRA").
35. 146 Cong. Rec. H7191 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Jerrold
Nadler) ("[RLUIPA] is different, more narrow, than the Religious Liberty Protection
Act we considered on the floor last year [which] had some people concerned with
some civil rights implications. Those concerns ... are not present in this bill.").
36. See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ").
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religious institutions as "religious exercise." '37 Second, RLUIPA is
designed to protect institutionalized persons (persons confined to
prisons, hospitals, and so forth) from infringement of their right to
free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.'
To accomplish the former goal, on which this Note will focus,
Congress targeted zoning and landmark laws because it considered
discrimination against religious institutions particularly insidious in
that arena. This Note will explore the extent to which RLUIPA's
land-use provisions are constitutional given the defects of Congress's
prior religious liberty bills, and ultimately will argue that RLUIPA
fails in two major respects. First, the record on which Congress relied
in enacting RLUIPA fell short of demonstrating a " pattern or
practice" of discrimination against religious institutions."9 Second,
RLUIPA excessively expands the Court's free exercise jurisprudence
in its attempt to protect religious institutions. For both of these
reasons, Congress exceeded the proper scope of its Section 5,
Fourteenth Amendment power.
Part I sets forth the background to the enactment of RLUIPA and
the constitutional hurdles that Congress sought to overcome in doing
so. Specifically, Part I discusses RLUIPA's compelling interest
standard and the history of that standard in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. It lays out Congress's previous attempts at religious
protection legislation and describes how RLUIPA can be
distinguished from those efforts, both in its scope and constitutional
foundation.
Part II examines the ongoing debate between scholars and
politicians over the status of, and constitutional basis for, RLUIPA.
Section A of Part II describes the arguments that support, as well as
those that oppose, finding a sufficient record of discrimination in the
land-use context for Congress to invoke its Section 5, Fourteenth
Amendment power. Section B discusses the debate over whether
RLUIPA is a codification of the Supreme Court's free exercise
jurisprudence or a departure from it.
37. RLUIPA, § 8(7) (defining "religious exercise"): id. § 8(5) (defining "land use
regulation").
3& Id. § 3(a). Section 3 of RLUIPA, entitled "Protection of Religious Exercise of
Institutionalized Persons," states that the "compelling governmental interest" test
shall be imposed on any government that places "a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 2 of
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997)." See Gregory S.
Walston, Federalism and Federal Spending: lhy the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 is Unconstitutional, 23 U. Haw. L Rev. 479
(2001) (discussing why RLUIPA as applied to institutionalized persons fails under the
Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause).
39. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507.534 (1997).
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Finally, Part III argues that RLUIPA was a premature enactment,"'
neither supported by a real need for such legislation nor consistent
with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. It shows that Congress has
again failed to satisfy the requirement that a "pattern or practice" of
discrimination exist before relying on the remedial power of Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part III will also discuss the most
likely interpretations of Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith4 as applied to zoning laws, and will argue that
RLUIPA unconstitutionally expands the legal definition of free
exercise provided by the Court's decision in Smith.
I. RLUIPA'S MUDDIED HISTORY
This part focuses on the free exercise jurisprudence and
Congressional action that culminated in RLUIPA's enactment. The
Act's background sheds light on why RLUIPA is so controversial. An
analysis of the elements that Congress juggled in crafting the bill is
essential to evaluating whether RLUIPA, as enacted, is constitutional.
This part analyzes RLUIPA's imposition of a compelling
governmental interest in certain land-use cases involving religious
institutions. It examines this standard in light of the Supreme Court's
free exercise jurisprudence in cases such as Smith, which held that
strict scrutiny was appropriate only in limited instances. This part also
explores Congress's previous attempts to protect religious liberty in
the wake of Smith, such as RFRA and the RLPA, and discusses
RLUIPA's relationship to this earlier legislation. Finally, Part I lays
out the constitutional bases on which Congress enacted RLUIPA, and
briefly addresses the limits of Section 5 enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A. RLUIPA's "Compelling Governmental Interest" Standard
As discussed in the Introduction, RLUIPA imposes a "compelling
governmental interest" standard on local governments in zoning cases
in order to remedy alleged discrimination against religious
institutions." In the Supreme Court's own words, "[r]equiring a State
to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it has adopted the
least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most
40. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Rhetoric of Religion, 20 U. Ark.
Little Rock L.J. 619, 631 (1998) (concluding that "it would be worthwhile to wait to
see how the Smith doctrine actually plays itself out in the courts" before enacting
religious protection legislation); Ira Lupu, The Failtre of RFRA, 20 U. Ark. Little
Rock L.J. 575, 602-03 (1998) (arguing that "the process of constitutional adjudication
should be allowed to work itself out on questions of religious liberty after Smith").
41. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
42. 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
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demanding test known to constitutional law."4 In fact, government
policies almost never survive review under the compelling interest or
"strict scrutiny" standard." Therefore, RLUIPA has the potential to
impose a significant burden on zoning boards faced with zoning issues
involving religious institutions.
In implementing this standard, Congress was responding to the 1990
case, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith.' In Smith, the Court held that a state prohibition against the
use of peyote, a hallucinatory drug, did not implicate the Free
Exercise Clause despite impinging on the sacramental use of the drug
by Native Americans. 46 The Court reasoned that the compelling
interest standard was too stringent in cases where "neutral law[s] of
general applicability" incidentally burdened the free exercise of
religion.47 Because the prohibition on peyote was not aimed at
inhibiting religion but rather was "neutral" and of "general
applicability,"' the Court did not analyze it under the Free Exercise
Clause and instead upheld the decision.
Many observers considered Smith to be a major blow to religious
freedom.49 Moreover, the Court's decision was perceived as reversing
43. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
44. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: fi Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L Rev. 1, 8 (1972)
(referring to the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny test as "strict' in theory and fatal in
fact"). But see Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214, 216, 218 (1944), where the
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny for the first time to a case of racial
classification, and found that the government's internment of Japanese-Americans
was justified by a compelling governmental interest).
45. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
46. Id. at 878-79.
47. Id. at 879 (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. See, e-g., Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 2148 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 6-7 (1998) [hereinafter Oaks
Testimony, 1998] (testimony of Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Member, Quorum of the
Twelve Apostles, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Salt Lake City, UT)
("With the abandonment of the compelling governmental interest test in the case of
Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court has permitted any level of
government to enact laws that interfere with an individual's religious worship or
practice .... This greatly increased latitude to restrict the free exercise of religion
must be curtailed by restoring the compelling governmental interest test."); Religious
Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 2148 Before the Senate Comn. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 18 (1998) (testimony of Richard D. Land, President-Treasurer,
Ethics and Religious Comm'n of the Southern Baptist Convention, Nashville, TN)
("The Smith decision was the worst religious liberty decision handed down by the
Supreme Court in my lifetime."); Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing
on S. 2148 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 22 (1998)
[hereinafter Zwiebel Testimony, 1998] (testimony of David Zwiebel, Dir. Of Gov't
Affairs and General Counsel, Agudath Israel of America, New York, NY) (-[Wlhen
the Supreme Court handed down its 1990 ruling in the Smith case.... a chill went up
and down the collective American Jewish spine."); see also, e.g.. Ira C. Lupu,
Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrisn, 1993
BYU L. Rev. 259, 260 ("I believe that Employment Division v. Smith is substantively
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its previous free exercise jurisprudence 0 in cases such as Sherbert v.
Verner5 and Wisconsin v. Yoder."
Sherbert was the first case in which the Supreme Court applied the
compelling interest test to a situation involving the Free Exercise
Clause. The Court reversed the Supreme Court of South Carolina's
holding that an applicant was ineligible for unemployment benefits
under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Ac 3
because she had refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath of the
Seventh-day Adventist Church, to which she belonged.54 In reversing,
the Supreme Court held that the South Carolina statute excessively
burdened the applicant's free exercise of religion by "forc[ing] her to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits ... and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work." 55  Because South Carolina had failed to
demonstrate a compelling state interest which justified the substantial
burden on her religious exercise, the Court found that denying the
wrong and institutionally irresponsible."); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109 (1990) (attacking the
Smith decision); Elliot Mincberg, A Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions:
Judicial Prior Restraint and the First Amendment, 44 Hastings L.J. 871, 871 (1993)
(asserting that Smith "severely damaged the right to free exercise of religion"). But
c.f, Ernest P. Fronzuto, III, Comment, An Endorsement for the Test of General
Applicability: Smith II, Justice Scalia, and the Conflict between Neutral Laws and the
Free Exercise of Religion, 6 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 713, 716 (1996) ("'[T]he test of
general applicability'.., has been throughout American history the prevailing
standard of free exercise review."); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of
Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 915 (1992)
(arguing that Smith's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has historical
support); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58
U. Chi. L. Rev. 308 (1991) (defending Smith against McConnell's attack).
50. E.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (expressing regret that
the majority's position "effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning
the Religion Clauses of our Constitution"); see also, e.g., David G. Savage & Richard
Simon, U.S. Restores Special Protections for Religious Groups, L.A. Times, Sept. 23,
2000, at A18 (noting that "in 1990, the high court reversed itself in [the Smith) case").
See Robert F. Drinan, Reflections on the Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 86 Geo. L.J. 101, 109 (1997) (referring to "the implicit reversal of Sherbert in
Smith"); Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections
from Human Rights Norms, 15 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1179, 1221 (1994) ("In Oregon v.
Smith, the Court reversed the precedent established in Sherbert... ."); James T.
Hunt, Jr., Casenote, Congress Exceeded Its Constitutional Authority Under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by Enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act - City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), 9 Seton Hall Const.
L.J. 609, 609 (1999) (noting that the Court's holding in Smith effectively "reversied]
decades of Free Exercise Clause precedent").
51. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-01 (citing S.C. Code Ann. tit. 68, §§ 68-1 to 68-404
(1952)).
54. Id. at 399-402.
55. Id. at 404.
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religious exemption violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause.56
Similarly in Yoder, the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's
compulsory school attendance law substantially burdened Amish
respondents' right to free exercise of religious beliefs that require
them to lead a life apart from "worldly influences."" Because the
state could not demonstrate a compelling state interest justifying this
burden, the Court upheld a religious exemption from the Wisconsin
law on the respondents' behalf.'
In Smith, the Court distinguished both Sherbert and Yoder, limiting
their scope more than many proponents of religious liberty had
anticipated. 9 The Court held that Sherbert's use of the compelling
state interest balancing test was limited to the unemployment
context,' finding that "where the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases
of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason. 61 Yoder was also
treated as an exception to the rule established in Smith because the
circumstances involved not "the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with [an]other constitutional
protection[], [namely] the right of parents... to direct the education
of their children."'  According to the Court's reasoning, therefore,
Sherbert and Yoder are mere exceptions to the general rule that
individuals must comply with every "generally applicable" law despite
any incidental infringement of religious conduct that the law may
involve.' To hold otherwise would permit the individual "'to become
a law unto himself' [which] contradicts both constitutional tradition
and common sense."'
B. Protecting Religious Institutions' Land-Use Liberty in the Wake of
Smith
The wording and legislative history of RLUIPA strongly suggest
that Congress intended RLUIPA section 2's prohibition against
substantially burdening religious exercise in the land-use context to
56. Id at 407-10.
57. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217-19.
58. Id. at 234-35.
59. E.g., Samuel Rabinove, The Supreme Court and Religious Freedom, Christian
Sci. Monitor, June 25, 1990, at 19 (noting that "'what was so extraordinary about
[Smith]-and what has sent shock waves through religious communities of every faith
all over the country-was its totally unexpected, and unnecessary, scope"); see also
supra notes 49-50.
60. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990).
61. Id. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
62- Id. at 881 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 879.
64. Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
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track the strict scrutiny exception laid out in Smith.65 Indeed, section 2
limits the compelling interest test to cases where "a government
makes... individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the
property involved," 66 thus circumventing Smith's instruction not to
apply strict scrutiny to laws of "general applicability." 67
In distinguishing Sherbert from the facts of Smith, the Supreme
Court noted that the compelling state interest test in Sherbert was
"developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct," a context where a
"system of individual exemptions" was in place.6' Oregon's
prohibition against the use of peyote did not involve any such
"exemptions" or "assessments," but rather a "neutral" and "generally
applicable" law, and therefore was not subject to the compelling
interest standard.69 Thus, in section 2 Congress used language
identical to that used by the Court in Smith to ensure that RLUIPA's
scope would fall within the Sherbert exception to the Smith rule.7"
Congress was particularly careful to focus on this distinction
because of the shortcomings of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 ("RFRA").71 Like RLUIPA, RFRA was designed to
protect religious liberty and to combat discrimination against religious
exercise.72 However, RFRA was far broader than RLUIPA and
imposed on state and federal governments alike the need to satisfy a
compelling interest test whenever neutral and generally applicable
laws "substantially burdened" an individual's free exercise of
65. 146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (noting that "[e]ach subsection [of
RLUIPA] closely tracks the legal standards in one or more Supreme Court opinions,
codifying those standards for greater visibility and easier enforceability," and citing
Smith's rule as being consistent with RLUIPA's imposition of the compelling state
interest test in cases of "individualized assessments").
66. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, § 2(a)(2)(C), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2001) (emphasis added). This section limits the general
rule of section 2(a)(1), in part, to cases where "the substantial burden is imposed in
the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices
that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses
for the property involved." Id.
67. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 879-80.
70. See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 109 (1999) [hereinafter Laycock Testimony, May 1999] (testimony of Douglas
Laycock, Assoc. Dean for Research, Univ. of Texas Law School) (discussing the
comparable provision of the RLPA section 3(b)(1)(A), as "enforc[ing] the free
exercise clause as interpreted in Smith").
71. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-bb (1994),
amended by RLUIPA, § 7.
72. RFRA, § 2(b)(2) (stating that the purpose of RFRA was "to provide a claim
or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by the
government").
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religion.73  In so doing, Congress attempted to circumvent the
Supreme Court's holding in Smith. Indeed, Congress's stated purpose
in enacting RFRA was "to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened."
In City of Boerne v. Flores,5 which itself involved a zoning dispute
between a church that was seeking to expand and the zoning board of
Boerne, a city in Texas, the Supreme Court found that RFRA was
unconstitutional as applied to the States. " Specifically, the Court
found that RFRA had exceeded Congress's power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Holding that the remedy of RFRA
was way out of proportion to any demonstrated ill, the Court
criticized the "substantive alteration of [the Smith] holding [that was]
attempted by RFRA" in imposing a compelling state interest test on
generally applicable laws. 78  Thus, RLUIPA's "individualized
assessment" language, which is taken verbatim from Smith, is clearly
Congress's attempt to avoid the ill-fated history of RFRA in City of
Boerne.
C. RLUIPA's Constitutional Basis: Section 5, Fourteenth Amendment
In its effort to tailor RLUIPA narrowly enough to track the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, Congress also sought to avoid
RFRA's more significant defect, namely that the Act had exceeded
Congress's Section 5, Fourteenth Amendment power to enforce that
Amendment's substantive provisions." In City of Boerne, the Court
reaffirmed the "remedial" nature of the Section 5 power' and held
that there was a dearth of evidence establishing a "pattern or
73. Id. § 3(b).
74. Id. § 2(b)(1). In crafting RFRA, Congress also noted that "the Supreme
Court [in Smith] virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion." Id. § 2(a)(4).
75. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
76. The Supreme Court expressly invalidated RFRA only as applied to the States.
Id. at 519.
77. Id. at 532-33; see infra Part I.C.
78. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177-78 (1803) (giving the Supreme Court the exclusive power to interpret the
Constitution and to declare invalid any law contradicting it).
79. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); see generally William G. Buss,
An Essay on Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 391 (1998) (discussing generally Congress's
remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5, and, in particular, that
power as applied in enacting RFRA).
80. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. See also University of Alabama v. Garrett,
where the Supreme Court most recently reiterated that "Congress'[s] § 5 [Fourteenth
Amendment] authority is appropriately exercised only in response to state
transgressions." 531 U.S. 356,368 (2001) (emphasis added).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
practice" of discrimination against religious groups.8 According to
the Court, RFRA could not "be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior" and thus did not
qualify as remedial legislation.' Moreover, the compelling interest
standard imposed by RFRA "lack[ed] proportionality or congruence
between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved." 3
Congress again attempted to employ its Section 5 enforcement
power in enacting RLUIPA but limited the Act's scope to land use
and institutionalized persons because a more substantial record of
discrimination had been established in those areas than in any other.'
Congress built up an evidentiary record throughout the course of
several hearings held after the 1997 City of Boerne decision.' The
record amassed consisted primarily of anecdotal and statistical
evidence of discrimination in the zoning context. Instances of
conflicts between religious institutions and zoning boards abound, and
the statistical evidence appears to corroborate such anecdotes.
However, this evidence is not clearly sufficient to justify Congress's
use of its Section 5 remedial power, because the Supreme Court's
cases have established a very stringent standard by which to assess the
use of such power. Indeed, Congress has rarely succeeded in
overcoming this hurdle.
Most recently, in University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Supreme
Court struck down Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA")86 as an abrogation of the States' immunity under the
81. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
82. Id. at 532.
83. Id. at 533.
84. Senators Hatch and Kennedy view the record as reflecting "forms of
discrimination [that] are very widespread," and found that "[tlhis discrimination
against religious [land] uses is a nationwide problem." 146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed.
July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
85. See The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, RLUIPA Home Page, at
http://www.rluipa.com/generaldocs/background/html (last visited Mar. 10, 2002). The
web page sets forth a summary of the pertinent hearings:
The Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee
held hearings on May 12, 1999, on HR 1691 ("Religious Liberty Protection
Act of 1999"); on June 16 and July 14, 1998 on HR 4019 ("Religious Liberty
Protection Act of 1998"); and a series of hearings on July 14, 1997, February
26, 1998, and March 26, 1998 ("Protecting Religious Freedom After City of
Boerne v. Flores")....
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings [were held on] June 23 and September
9, 1999 on "Issues Relating to Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on
the Constitutionality of a Religious Protection Measure."
On June 23, 1998, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on S.2148,
the "Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998," [and on] October 1, 1997,
the Senate Judiciary Committee also held oversight hearings on "Congress'
constitutional role in protecting religious liberty in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision in the case of City of Boerne v. Flores."
Id.
86. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (2000).
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Eleventh Amendment s7 because Congress had exceeded its Section 5
power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment protections.z' As in City of
Boerne, "[t]he legislative record of the ADA... simply fail[ed] to
show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state
discrimination in employment against the disabled."'a Although
Congress conducted hearings, gathered anecdotal evidence of
instances of discrimination, and concluded generally that "society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities," ' its
record was still held insufficient to satisfy the stringent requirement of
"a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the
Fourteenth Amendment." '91
In both City of Boerne and Garrett, the Supreme Court contrasted
the legislative histories of RFRA and the ADA, respectively, with
that of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, the Court had upheld the Voting Rights Act as
"appropriate" legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment's
mandate against racial discrimination in the context of voting.- In
that case, Congress "documented a marked pattern of
unconstitutional action by the States" in that "officials... routinely
applied voting tests in order to exclude African-American citizens
from registering to vote,.., litigation had proved ineffective and...
there persisted an othervise inexplicable 50-percentage-point gap in
the registration of white and African-American voters in some
States."'93
Recognizing the strictness of the Supreme Court's standard in the
arena of Section 5 enforcement power, Congress further attempted to
ensure the validity of RLUIPA by relying on the Commerce Clause
and Spending Clause 94 as constitutional bases for the Act s The goals
87. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
88. Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett. 531 U.S. 356. 368 (2001).
89. Id.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
91. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
92. South Carolina v. Katenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966): see also Garrett, 531
U.S. at 373 n.8 (noting that "Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually
identical to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment").
93. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 312-13).
94. In addition to cases where the government makes -individualized
assessments" in land-use regulations, the "compelling interest" test applies in two
other circumstances. First, the standard applies in cases where -the substantial
burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance."
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, § 2(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a)(2)(A) (2001) (basing this enactment on the Spending Clause). Second, it
applies where "the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian
tribes." Id. § 2(a)(2)(B) (basing this enactment on the Commerce Clause).
95. See Evan M. Shapiro, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
AcL" An Analysis Under the Connerce Clause, 76 Wash. L Rev. 1255 (2001)
(discussing why RLUIPA fails under Congress's Commerce Clause power).
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of RLUIPA, however, fall squarely within the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees that "[n]o State shall make
or enforce any law which... [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."96 The Court held in 1940
that the "fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause] embraces the liberties guaranteed
by the First Amendment."'  Therefore, it is likely that the Court will
focus primarily on Congress's Fourteenth Amendment Section 5
power in assessing the constitutional validity of RLUIPA.9s
Given the Supreme Court's demanding standard and the
complicated background of religious liberty legislation since Smith,
RLUIPA's validity must be closely analyzed. Having evolved
throughout the course of discussions on RFRA and the RLPA, the
debates over RLUIPA's constitutionality are laid out in Part II and
serve to contextualize the analysis of Part III.
II. DEBATES OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RLUIPA
Because RLUIPA is such a recent enactment, the Supreme Court
has not yet had the opportunity to address the question of its
constitutionality, nor has this issue made its way into the federal
circuit courts. While several federal district courts have confronted
claims by religious institutions of RLUIPA violations in the land-use
context, none have addressed the question of its constitutionality.99
However, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in City of Boerne,
Smith, and beyond, sheds light on two major aspects of the Act's
constitutionality. Part II.A addresses the constitutional basis of
RLUIPA, while Part II.B examines the issue of RLUIPA's scope
given the legal restrictions set forth in Smith.
This part lays out the conflicting arguments concerning RLUIPA's
constitutionality on these two central issues. First, Section A details
96. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
97. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940).
98. Eisgruber Testimony, 1998, supra note 34, at 33 (discussing the constitutional
bases for the RLPA of 1998 and noting that "concerns about religious liberty... are
concerns most appropriately articulated through the goals of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
99. See C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (assuming
that RLUIPA was constitutional, and holding that zoning laws which restricted
church locations did not discriminate against religion within the meaning of
RLUIPA); Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 202 F.R.D. 402
(S.D.N.Y., 2001) (finding that a religious corporation could not intervene in a suit
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 over building monopole on adjacent
property which would ruin the view from the corporation's property because there
was no protectable interest); Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D.
Conn. 2001) (presuming the constitutionality of RLUIPA in finding in favor of
plaintiff's RLUIPA claims because the cease-and-desist order was not the least
restrictive means of fulfilling the government's interest in protecting neighbors' health
and safety against problems caused by plaintiffs' prayer services).
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the record of discrimination on which Congress based its use of
Section 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment and examines the
arguments for and against finding a "pattern or practice""'  of
discrimination in the context of religious land-use controversies.
Proponents of RLUIPA argue that the record is replete with
anecdotal and statistical evidence of discrimination, or at least
prejudice, against religious institutions in land-use cases. In response,
opponents challenge the sufficiency of such evidence, claiming that
the record does not establish a pattern or practice of discrimination
that rises to the level necessary for Congress to rely on its Section 5
power.
Second, even if there were a sufficient record of discrimination to
justify remedial or preventive legislation, Section B lays out the
arguments for, and against, RLUIPA's validity in light of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith. While
RLUIPA's proponents assert that the Act's "individualized
assessment" language tracks the Supreme Court's reasoning in Smith,
its opponents contend that RLUIPA is a departure from the Court's
jurisprudence. Opponents further argue that RLUIPA is not an
"appropriate" departure because the factual record lacks sufficient
evidence of widespread discrimination against religious institutions in
the United States,10' and thus the enactment lacks proportionality to
the ills sought to be remedied. This debate is important in shedding
light on RLUIPA's scope and validity.
A. Congress's Record of Land-Use Discrimination
1. Proponents: A Pattern of Discrimination
In response to City of Boerne, in which the Supreme Court struck
down RFRA, Congress debated, but never passed, the Religious
Liberty Protection Acts of 1998 and 1999. Critics cited several
shortcomings in the RLPA for which RFRA had also been faulted,
such as over-breadth and infringement of other substantive rights."'
100. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,534 (1997).
101. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 213 (1980) (Rehnquist. J.,
dissenting) ("[Cjongressional prohibition of some conduct which may not itself
violate the Constitution is 'appropriate' legislation 'to enforce' the ... Amendments if
that prohibition is necessary to remedy prior constitutional violations.., or if
necessary to effectively prevent purposeful discrimination ... ").
102. Hamilton Testimony, 1998, supra note 34, at 40 (arguing that the RLPA of
1998 is unconstitutional because it "attempt[s] to amend the Constitution without
Article V procedures"); see also American Civil Liberties Union, Freedom Network,
Effect of the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998 on State and Local Civil Rights
Laws (Jan. 25, 1999), at http://www.aclu.org/congressA112599a.html ((stating that
"passage of an unamended RLPA would have undermined many state and local civil
rights laws by creating a new defense against civil rights claims brought under those
laws").
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Therefore, Congress limited its previous attempts significantly in
crafting RLUIPA.1°3
Recognizing that the record of adverse treatment of religious
institutions was most conspicuous in the area of land use,1'4 Congress
tailored RLUIPA's scope to the record of discrimination before it. °' -
In justifying the use of its Section 5 power, Congress relied on a
record of anecdotal and statistical evidence that purported to show
discrimination against religious institutions.0 6 Both types of evidence
can be further classified into two distinct categories. The first
category consists of cases pertaining to restrictions on the initial
construction of a religious building in a particular district. 07  The
second category involves instances where religious institutions are
prevented from expanding already-existing structures onto
neighboring lots or within the boundaries of their own property.10 8
a. Anecdotal Evidence Involving Land- Use Regulations That Restrict
the Initial Construction of a Religious Building
Within the former category fall complaints that churches "are being
zoned out of cities because of their social service ministries to the
destitute,"'" their failure to bring economic value to commercial
areas, and their incongruous presence in residential areas. One oft-
cited example is the case of the Refuge, a missionary church in St.
Petersburg, Florida."' The Refuge conducts social welfare programs
such as feeding the homeless, counseling alcoholics and HIV-infected
103. See supra note 35.
104. See supra note 84.
105. 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch) ("It is no secret that I would have preferred a broader bill than the one before
us today. Recognizing, however, the hurdles facing passage of such a bill, supporters
have correctly ... agreed to move forward on this more limited, albeit critical,
effort.").
106. Id. at S7775 (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy) ("Some of this evidence is statistical .... Some is anecdotal, with examples
from all over the country.").
107. Von G. Keetch & Matthew K. Richards, The Need for Legislation to Enshrine
Free Exercise in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 725, 736 (1999)
(attached Appendix with the Brigham Young study which breaks down the religious
land use cases into these same two categories, calling them "location cases" and
"accessory use cases").
108. See id.
109. Issues Relating to Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the
Constitutionality of a Religious Protection Measure: Hearing Before the Senate Conln.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 4 (1999) [hereinafter McFarland Testimony, June 1999]
(statement of Steven T. McFarland, Center for Law and Religious Freedom, Christian
Legal Society, Annandale, VA).
110. Id. at 7-8 (citing The Refuge Pinellas, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 755 So.2d
119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)); see also 146 Cong. Record E1566 (daily ed. Sept. 22,
2000) (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde).
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individuals, and working with juvenile offenders."' In so doing, the
Refuge is "doing exactly what Christ calls His Church to do." 2
However, St. Petersburg ordered the Refuge to leave its current
location, labeling it a "social service agency" rather than a "church"
for zoning purposes.' 13  Notably, the City's zoning law permits
churches in the area where the Refuge is located, but forbids social
service agencies."' In response to the Church's complaint, the City
compared the Refuge to a "stink weed" that was likely to have "a
negative impact on the rose garden and [that needed to] be weeded
out."
1 5
In Michigan, the Grand Haven zoning board denied the Haven
Shores Community Church a building permit for altering the
storefront property that it had rented."6 The City of Grand Haven
objected to the permit because the storefront was located in a business
district zoned for private clubs and schools, fraternal organizations,
concert halls, and funeral homes, but not for churches."1  In
December 2000, District Judge McKeague signed a consent order
permitting the church to occupy the storefront."8 This case involves
one of the first settlements to be reached pursuant to RLUIPA."9
In Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, the zoning code
completely excluded churches from business districts while permitting
them to build only in residential districts. 2 The prohibition was
upheld.' Conversely, in Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses,
Inc. v. City of Lakewood, the city of Lakewood, Ohio, designed its
zoning code to exclude churches from residential areas because of the




115. Id. at 8 (citing City's Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 3, in
Refuge Pinellas).
116. Alicia Benjamin-Samuels, Michigan Church Wins Right to Worship in
Storefront, The Freedom Forum Online (Jan. 4, 2001). at
http://-vww.freedomforum.org/templatesldocument.asp?documentlD=l-2976; see 146
Cong. Rec. E1565 (daily ed. Sept. 22,2000) (statement of Rep. Henry 1. Hyde) (citing
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty's complaint on behalf of the Haven Shores
Community Church as "alleging religious discrimination"); Roman P. Storzer &
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 929, 946 (2001) (citing Haven Shores Community Church v. City of Grand
Haven, No. 00-175 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 20,2000) (consent decree)).
117. See Benjamin-Samuels, supra note 116.
11& See Haven Shores, No. 00-175.
119. See id.
120. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D. Minn.
1990) (upholding exclusion of churches from business districts because they could
locate in residential districts), rev'd in part, on other g'nds, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir.
1991)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 106-219, at 19 (1999) [hereinafter House Report, 19991
(statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady) (citing Cornerstone Bible).
121. Cornerstone Bible, 740 F. Supp. at 663.
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"traffic hazards, increase[d] noise levels, potentially decrease[d]
property values, and... various other problems."'" The Sixth Circuit
found that relegating the building of new churches to ten percent of
the city was not a free exercise violation because building a church
was an "accessory of worship, not a fundamental tenet."'' 3
In Long Island, a beach-side community wanted to exclude a
synagogue, claiming that it would attract excessive traffic on Friday
nights. 4 The town and trial judge agreed.1 5 However, the court of
appeals judge held for the synagogue, finding that the synagogue
would be no more disruptive than the large secular parties typically
held on Friday nights.16
Another frequently cited case involves the Etz Chaim congregation
of elderly and disabled Orthodox Jews located in the Hancock Park
area of Los Angeles. 27  Because the members were unable to walk
long distances and Orthodox Jews are not allowed to use cars on the
Sabbath, in 2000 they sought a conditional use permit to establish a
synagogue in one of the houses in Hancock Park, an area zoned only
for single-family dwellings." The Hancock Park Homeowners
Association complained that a synagogue would decrease property
values. 29 The permit was denied despite the fact that other places of
122. Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d
303, 305 (6th Cir. 1983); see Storzer & Picarello, supra note 116, at 956 (citing
Lakewood).
123. Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307. The Sixth Circuit's reasoning has been viewed as
highly problematical. See, e.g., Storzer & Picarello, supra note 116, at 956 (concluding
that Lakewood's "astonishing holding... clearly demonstrates the need for
[RLUIPAI"). Note that RLUIPA's definition of "religious exercise" precludes such
reasoning. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, § 8(7),
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7) (2001). The Supreme Court's own analysis suggests that the
Sixth Circuit's reasoning that church-building does not amount to a "fundamental
tenet" is an improper inquiry. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) (finding it "[injappropriate for judges to determine
the 'centrality' of religious beliefs before applying a 'compelling interest' test in the
free exercise field").
124. The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998. Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 11
(1998) [hereinafter Stern Testimony] (statement of Marc D. Stern, Director, Legal
Department, American Jewish Congress).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See 146 Cong. Rec. E1566 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Henry
J. Hyde) (citing Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, No. 97-5042 (C.D.
Cal. June 1, 1998) (order and memorandum opinion)); Protecting Religious Freedom
After Boerne v. Flores, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 32-36 (1998) (statement of Rabbi Chaim Baruch
Rubin, Congregation Etz Chaim, Los Angeles, CA) (discussing the Congregation Etz
Chaim's difficulties with zoning laws); Lampman, supra note 14, at 14 ("The Hancock
Park congregation in Los Angeles is a poignant case in point.").
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assembly, such as schools, were permitted there." The California
court of appeals affirmed the denial because alternative locations for
prayer were available. 131
b. Anecdotal Evidence Involving Land-Use Regulations That Restrict
Expansion of Religious Building Itself or of Uses Made of Building
The second category consists of cases, such as City of Boerne and St.
Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 32 where the needs of
growing churches have conflicted with local desires to restrict such
growth as well as with the interests served by landmark and zoning
laws.
Concerns about parking and traffic congestion often cause zoning
boards to deny accessory use permits to religious institutions. A
conflict of this nature arose in a suburb of San Antonio, Texas, just
last year.133 The congregation of Castle Hills First Baptist Church had
increased significantly since its establishment in the 1950s to its
current size of 17,000.'1 In the late 1990s, the church acquired six
residential lots across the street for parking. 3 ' San Antonio allowed it
to demolish and remove the homes on the lots, but has, at the current
time, yet to grant a special permit allowing construction of parking
lots.136 Instead, the City Council has repeatedly denied the special
permit, forcing many church members to park on the far side of a
major highway in order to attend the church services. "'7
In City of Boerne, the Archbishop of San Antonio, Texas, applied
for a building permit to enlarge St. Peter Catholic Church because the
building was no longer large enough to accommodate the growing
congregation.' 38 According to the applicable zoning ordinance, any
construction in a landmark district, such as the one where St. Peter's
was located, had to obtain the approval of Boerne's Historic
130. Id
131. Id See generally Zwiebel Testimony, 1998, supra note 49, at 23 (-Zoning laws
that make it difficult, or virtually impossible, to build houses of worship within
residential areas [often] have the practical impact of excluding Orthodox Jews from
those areas.").
132. 914 F.2d 348, 355-56 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding denial of Church's multiple
applications to convert a seven-story community house into a significantly larger
office tower).
133. The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Summary, at http'/wwwv.rluipa.comJ
cases/CastleHills.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2002) (citing Castle Hills First Baptist





138. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. 511-12 (1997); see also Storzer &
Picarello. supra note 116, at 959 & n.197 (citing City of Boerne as an accessory use
case).
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Landmark Commission. 139 The Commission denied the Church's
application. 140
Similarly in St. Bartholomew's Church, the Second Circuit affirmed
the denial of a Church's application for permission to replace a seven-
story Community House with a fifty-nine-story office tower. 41 The
application was denied despite the Church's demonstrated need for
extra space to accommodate religious and social programs and its
invocation of the landmark ordinance's "hardship exception.' ' 42
c. Statistical Evidence Documenting Land- Use Discrimination Against
Religious Institutions
In addition to the anecdotal evidence presented by witnesses during
the congressional hearings on religious liberty protection, surveys of
religious land-use litigation and of zoning-code policies were
submitted. According to Senators Orrin Hatch and Edward Kennedy,
Congress based its finding that land-use "discrimination [is] very
widespread" '143 on the "hearing record [which] compiled massive
evidence that [the right to religious land use] is frequently violated."'"'1
Many of the witnesses who testified before Congress drew upon a
study conducted by Professor W. Cole Durham of Brigham Young
University in conjunction with lawyers at Mayer, Brown & Platt. 15
The study examined all 196 reported cases involving free exercise
139. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511-12.
140. Id.
141. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 351-52 (2d Cir.
1990); see Storzer & Picarello, supra note 116, at 959 & n.197 (citing St. Barholomew's
Church as an accessory use case).
142. St. Bartholomew's Church, 914 F.2d at 351-52.
143. 146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
144. Id. at S7774.
145. The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 131-
32, 141-46 (1998) [hereinafter Durham Testimony, 1998] (statement of Prof. W. Cole
Durham, Jr., Brigham Young Univ. Law School) (discussing Brigham Young study);
see also, e.g., Issues Relating to Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the
Constitutionality of a Religious Protection Measure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 83-84 (1999)
[hereinafter Laycock Testimony, June 1999] (statement of Douglas Laycock,
Associate Dean for Research, Univ. of Texas Law School) (drawing on Professor
Durham's study to support his advocacy); Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne
v. Flores, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 56, 60-72 (1998) (statement of Von G. Keetch, Counsel to
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints) (discussing Professor Durham's 1997
study); Oaks Testimony, 1998, supra note 49, at 7 (pointing to Durham's study as
"compelling evidence that the Smith test is burdening religious freedoms in many
areas" and noting, in particular, the "huge disparity" found in the impact of land-use
laws); Lampman, supra note 14 (citing Brigham Young study for proposition that "[it
has become clear that small religious groups are vastly overrepresented in church-
zoning cases").
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challenges in the context of land-use regulation from 1921 to 1997.11
In his own testimony to Congress in 1998 on the need for legislative
action in the religious land-use context, Professor Durham
summarized the results of the study as follows: "Minority religions
representing less than 9% of the population were involved in over
49% of the cases regarding the right to locate religious buildings at a
particular site, and in over 33% of the cases seeking approval of
accessory uses."''47 These statistics, he argued, indicate that minority
religions, such as Judaism and small Christian denominations, are
vastly over-represented in zoning litigation and "frequently
discriminated against."'" While conceding that other factors could
partially explain this phenomenon, Professor Durham concluded that
"religious discrimination" must "play[] a significant role" and noted
that the survey of reported cases represents "only the tip of the
iceberg" because many similar disputes are not followed to the end or
result in settlement.149
The Brigham Young study shows that the over-representation of
minority faiths is particularly acute in location cases in which religious
institutions seek to build new structures at a site or to move into an
already-existing building.'5 According to Douglas Laycock, "[tihis
difference in treatment can be understood as discrimination based on
the scope of the religious mission, or simply as a governmental
restriction on the scope of religious missions." "I' Whatever the
reason, proponents found the study's "disparities [to be] conspicuous
[and to] lead quickly to the conclusion that minority religions have a
much harder time obtaining approval for construction of a house of
worship... than do majority religions."'"
Proponents of RLUIPA also rely on Durham's study for the
proposition that, once in court, minority faiths "win their cases at
about the same rate as larger churches."'5t-3 This evidence, they assert,
demonstrates that the claims brought by smaller churches are as
146. The study includes two cases from the 1920s: Shaffer v. Temple Beth Emeth,
190 N.Y.S. 841 (App. Div. 1921) and Westminster Presbyterian Church v. Edgecomb,
189 N.W. 617 (Neb. 1922).
147. Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 136.
148. 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (referring to the "hearing record").
149. Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 136; see also Keetch & Richards,
supra note 107, at 731 (noting that "churches probably bring far fewer actions in this
area than they may be entitled to bring" which "only underscores [that] religions are
significantly disadvantaged in seeking land use accommodations as they deal with
'generally applicable' and 'neutral' laws").
150. Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 136 (citing Brigham Young
study).
151. Laycock Testimony, June 1999, supra note 145, at 83 (discussing Brigham
Young study).
152. Keetch & Richards, supra note 107, at 729.
153. Laycock Testimony, June 1999, supra note 145, at 83 (discussing Brigham
Young study).
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meritorious as those of larger ones, and that smaller churches are
being subject to very real discrimination at the zoning-board level. 54
In fact, there is evidence that religious institutions as a whole, as
opposed to simply minority groups, face discrimination in land-use
conflicts. John Mauck, a Chicago practitioner, estimates that "30% of
the cases in the Chicago Board of Zoning Appeals involve
churches." '155 While not dispositive, this tends to corroborate the
assertion that religious groups as a whole, not just minority religions,
are over-represented in land-use litigation.
A second survey, conducted by the Presbyterian Church USA in
1997, surveyed all Presbyterian congregations regarding land-use
conflicts. 56 Twenty-three percent of the responding congregations'57
attested to having needed a land-use permit during the period since
1992.158 Ten percent said that they had had a "significant conflict"
with the government or their neighbors over such land-use permits. 5
Moreover, eight percent had faced a substantially increased (by more
than ten percent) cost in their respective building projects as a result
of conditions imposed by local governments.' 6°
The Presbyterian survey further showed that one percent of the
responding congregations had encountered "a clear rule," applying
only to churches, that forbade what the church sought to do. 6' In
contrast, ten percent had faced "a clear rule," applying only to
churches, that permitted what the church sought to do. 6 According
to Laycock, a vocal proponent of RLUIPA, these statistics "confirm
what no one disputes-that some communities accommodate the
needs of churches. Land use discrimination against churches is
widespread but not universal."' 63
In further support of its findings that religious groups are unfairly
targeted in zoning board decisions, Congress took into account
evidence by John Mauck' 64 whose study of Chicago zoning codes
154. Keetch & Richards, supra note 107, at 729.
155. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 755, 773 (1999) (citing conversation with John Mauck in Washington, D.C., on
June 16, 1998) [hereinafter Laycock, State RFRAs].
156. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998. Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 204-
07 (1998) [hereinafter Ivory Testimony] (statement of Rev. Elenora Giddings Ivory,
Dir., Wash. Office, Presbyterian Church (USA)); see also Laycock Testimony, June
1999, supra note 145, at 84 (citing the Presbyterian survey and its results); Durham
Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 136-37 (citing Presbyterian survey).
157. Roughly ninety percent of the Presbyterian congregations are estimated to
have responded. Ivory Testimony, supra note 156, at 204.
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revealed that ten out of twenty-nine Chicago suburbs permit churches
to locate only in residential districts.' Laycock explains that the right
to locate in residential districts is "illusory for all but the tiniest
congregations," and therefore restricting churches to residential areas
is a tacit form of discrimination."6
In sum, a substantial amount of evidence was presented to Congress
on religious land use. Proponents argue that the anecdotal and
statistical records are "mutually reinforcing" and amount to a
pattern. 167  While some express hesitation in using the word
"persecution" in the context of religious land use, proponents agree
that the record presents clear evidence of discrimination against
religious institutions."
2. Opposing Argument: Not a Pattern of Discrimination
While recognizing that the anecdotal evidence reveals difficulties
for religious institutions in the land-use context, opponents contend
that the evidence does not point to a pattern or practice of
discrimination.69  They further argue that the imposition of a
compelling interest standard is not rationally targeted at remedying
the record of mistreatment.' 7
a. Evidentiary Record Does Not Amount to a Pattern of Discrimination
Opponents of RLUIPA (and its predecessors) consider the
evidence of religious land-use discrimination to be far from
conclusive, and believe that the anecdotal and statistical findings fail
to amount to a pattern or practice of discrimination within the
Supreme Court's strict definition.
During the 1998 Congressional hearings on the RLPA, Professor
Marci Hamilton distinguished "[d]iscriminatory impact," which would
not satisfy the Court's strict standard, from "discrimination." ' She
stated that demonstrating "a national practice of discrimination"
Subcomn. on the Constitution of the House Comnn. on the Judiciarv, 105th Cong. 91-
130 (1998) (statement of John Mauck, Attorney, Mauck, Bellande & Cheely, Chicago,
IL).
165. Id. at 100-01 (reproducing study entitled "'Compilation of Zoning Provisions
Affecting Churches in 29 Suburbs of Northern Cook County by John W. Mauck of 7-
10-98 Based Upon 1995 Published Standards").
166. Laycock, State RFRAs. supra note 155, at 761. He explains that "-[unless your
congregation can meet in a single house, the only way to build a church in a
residential area is to buy several adjacent lots and tear down the houses." hi.
167. Laycock Testimony, June 1999, supra note 145, at 83.
168. E.g., Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 131-32 (alleging that the
factual evidence demonstrates "an overwhelming pattern of discrimination").
169. E.g., Hamilton Testimony, 1998, supra note 34, at 71 (on land-use provisions
of the RLPA of 1998); see also infra Part III.A.
170. E.g., Eisgruber Testimony, 1998, supra note 34, at 38.
171. Hamilton Testimony, 1998, supra note 34, at 71.
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requires "fairly persuasive evidence," which she did not believe had
been demonstrated in 1998.172 She acknowledged that while some
evidence demonstrated that churches were disproportionately and
adversely impacted by zoning decisions, there was no pattern of
discrimination, no consistent "targeting of a specific religion.' 73
Rather, there were only scattered instances of abuse. 174
Likewise, in response to RLUIPA, Hamilton argued that the
Congressional hearings were one-sided and lacked sufficient evidence
of discrimination. 75 As a reason for the RLUIPA-friendly record, she
cited the "[u]ndue [i]nfluence of [r]eligious [l]obbyists" as well as the
fact that "no land use official or neighbor to a religious building was
ever permitted to testify. ' 176  According to Hamilton, the "record
relie[d] on anecdotal accounts of discrimination against religious
buildings in land use," but she noted that "there are precious few
cases."17
7
Hamilton contended that the cases of conflict between religious
institutions and zoning boards were not generally instances of
discrimination. 178 Nor did she think that such cases even "involve[d]
the free exercise of religion [because] they [were] simply garden-
variety land use cases where the landowner who claim[ed] a special
use exemption happens to be religious.' ' 79
In a letter to the Senate, dated July 24, 2000, Hamilton expressed
her concerns about RLUIPA's severe constitutional deficiencies."'
There, she asserted that "the supporters of RLUIPA have cobbled
together a short string of anecdotes that do not illustrate
constitutional violations, and certainly do not illustrate 'widespread
and persisting' constitutional violations by the states."'' Although
acknowledging that land-use regulations have an "effect" on churches,
she concluded that the record lacked any "good evidence of




175. Marci Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as Neighbors: Land Use Conflicts







180. Letter from Marci A. Hamilton, Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, Yeshiva University, to United States Senate, (July 24, 2000),
http://www.marcihamilton.com/rlpa/rluipa-letter.htm [hereinafter Hamilton Letter,
2000].
181. Id.
182. Id. In addition to Fourteenth Amendment flaws, Hamilton cites deficiencies
in RLUIPA with respect to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, Spending
Clause, Tenth Amendment principles of federalism, and Establishment Clause. Id.
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b. RLUIPA Is Not Congruent to Record of Religious Land Use
Opponents also disagree with the Congressional finding that
RLUIPA is "proportionate to the widespread discrimination." '13
They contend just the opposite'-that imposing a compelling state
interest on zoning boards in cases involving religious institutions fails
the proportionality standard articulated in City of Boerne.t  In City
of Boerne, the Supreme Court found that RFRA could not "be
considered remedial, preventive legislation [because] RFRA [was] so
out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object."''
RFRA was sweeping in both "reach and scope.""' Because the
record was so sparse, the Act was not even a "[p]reventive measure[]
[of the sort] appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of
the laws affected by the congressional enactment have a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional.""
In addressing land-use discrimination in the context of the RLPA
section 3(b), the corollary of RLUIPA section 2, Professor
Christopher Eisgruber argued that imposing the compelling state
interest test on zoning boards lacked proportionality to the
demonstrated evils.1" In his testimony to Congress on the issue, he
stated that he had "[n]o doubt" that: "zoning administrators
sometimes abuse their authority to harm unpopular churches. But
that problem is not reasonably attacked by extending all churches-no
matter how rich, how powerful, or how favored in law-a blanket writ
to challenge the zoning ordinances which every other citizen and
institution must respect."''
In so doing, Eisgruber implicitly acknowledged the validity of the
statistics showing that minority religions are over-represented in land-
use disputes but insisted that the compelling interest test is
inappropriate to remedying that problem. 9' Rather, he argued that
RLPA lacked all proportionality to the problem at issue." - Because
of the similarity between the RLPA and RLUIPA's land-use
provisions, Eisgruber's arguments can be equally applied to RLUIPA.
Likewise, Professor Lawrence Sager argues that RLUIPA is much
broader than the evils that it was designed to protect against. 93 He
183. 146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
184. See infra notes 189-99.
185. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,530 (1997).
186. Id. at 532.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Eisgruber Testimony, 1998, supra note 34, at 32-34, 38.
190. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192- Id.
193. Lawrence G. Sager, Free Exercise After Smith and Boerne. 57 Ann. Surv. Am.
L. 9, 14-15 (2000).
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argues that "RLUIPA is not fairly characterized as a means of
protecting churches against discrimination." 94 Rather, "it is a bald
and rather extreme privileging of churches for which no justification is
available." 95 He furnishes examples of "much more narrowly tailored
or surgically designed legislation" that would have better "protected
churches against municipal discrimination."'96  For instance, he
suggests that Congress could have passed "legislation that did not
permit houses of worship to violate height restrictions but did entitle
them to locate in residential districts absent a compelling state interest
to the contrary."' 97 This approach would narrowly target what he
perceives as a legitimate problem documented in the legislative
record, without affecting those land-use restrictions that do not
present problems.
In addition to believing that there is no pattern of discrimination,
Professor Hamilton agrees that RLUIPA's compelling interest
provisions lack proportionality to the evidentiary record. 98 She
argues that RLUIPA's "blanket approach is clearly incongruent and
disproportional to any problems churches are experiencing in the land
use context."' 199
Based on their reasoning that the record lacks a clear pattern of
discrimination and that RLUIPA is disproportionate to the record of
religious land-use treatment that Congress compiled, opponents
conclude that RLUIPA is an invalid use of Congress's Section 5,
Fourteenth Amendment power.2° Moreover, opponents contend that
imposing a compelling interest test on zoning boards raises serious
questions about Congress's regard for the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith, because it is not automatically clear that RLUIPA's standard is
consistent with that jurisprudence.
B. RLUIPA's Individualized-Assessment Limitation: Does RL UIPA
Exceed the Scope of the Free Exercise Clause?
As laid out in Part I, Congress has limited RLUIPA's scope to
instances of "individualized assessments" in order to avoid
contradicting the Supreme Court's holding in Smith."' l However, the
Court's distinction in Smith between generally applicable laws to
which a compelling state interest test is inapplicable and instances,
194. Id. at 15.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 14.
197. Id. at 15.
198. See Hamilton Letter, 2000, supra note 180.
199. Id.
200. Id. (stating that "it is highly unlikely that RLUIPA will withstand judicial
scrutiny," and referring to RLUIPA as conferring "an unconstitutional benefit").
201. See supra Part I.B.
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such as Sherbert,'2 where the stringent standard may be applied -"' is
nebulous. Although Smith explains that Sherbert "was developed in a
context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of
the reasons for the relevant conduct"2 and therefore constituted an
exception to the rule affecting generally applicable laws, the Court did
not clarify the breadth of the Sherbert exception." Moreover, the
Court did not specifically address land-use regulations, and cases since
Smith have failed to elucidate this question. -b
Proponents of RLUIPA and several lower courts have interpreted
the Sherbert exception broadly enough to include zoning and
landmark laws.2 7  However, others have construed the Court's
"individualized assessment" language more narrowly so as to exclude
many land-use laws from the exception's scope.2
1. Proponents: RLUIPA Codifies Smith
Proponents argue that RLUIPA is constitutional because its
provisions carefully track the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.'z This
is true because RLUIPA's Section 2 narrowly tailors the scope of the
compelling governmental interest test, limiting its applicability to
cases where zoning boards make "individualized assessments of the
proposed uses for the property involved." 210 This terminology mirrors
the individualized assessment language employed in Smith."
Proponents contend that RLUIPA's limitation to individualized
assessments is distinct from the cases of generally applicable laws that
Smith addresses .2 1  According to this reasoning, the Supreme Court's
202. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, an unemployment
benefits exemption case, the Court found that the government did have to pass the
"compelling state interest" test before it could substantially burden the petitioner's
free exercise of her religion. Id. at 408.
203. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-90
(1989).
204. Id. at 884.
205. Id. at 882-90.
206. See Hamilton Testimony, 1998. supra note 34, at 71.
207. See infra Part II.B.1.
208. See infra Part II.B.2; see also Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in fie
Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions fron Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 1045, 1065-67 (2000) (discussing the divergent approaches that lower courts have
taken in construing the Sherbert exception in the land-use context).
209. See supra Part I.B.
210. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, § 2(a)(2)(C), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2001).
211. 146 Cong. Rec. S7775-76 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
212. See, e.g., Storzer & Picarello, supra note 116, at 949 (stating that -such
individualized assessments are not 'neutral laws of general applicability'"); see also
House Report, 1999, supra note 120, at 17 (stating that the RLPA's section
3(b)(1)(A), which is practically identical to RLUIPA's section 2(a)(2)(C), -tracks the
Smith opinion's explanation that, where governmental bodies possess authority to
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holding in Smith does not apply to applications for zoning permits
because those applications require the state to make individualized
assessments. Therefore, RLUIPA neither contradicts Smith nor
"expand[s] the application of the Free Exercise Clause. 2 13 Rather,
the compelling interest standard set forth in Sherbertl4 applies to such
individualized assessments in the zoning context,215 and RLUIPA
successfully "tracks" the Supreme Court's own reasoning. According
to Professor Laycock, for example, the RLPA's "individualized
assessment" limitation (which is almost identical to RLUIPA's section
2) is a provision to "enforce the free exercise clause as interpreted in
Smith."216
Moreover, attorney Roman Storzer argues that "[i]t is difficult to
imagine a context that is more concerned with individualized
governmental assessments than the granting or denying of conditional
use permits, special use permits, or variances."2"7 He maintains that
RLUIPA "does little more than codify the strict scrutiny review that
already applies under the Free Exercise Clause in situations involving
'individualized assessments"' and cites Smith to support his
argument.218
In further support of their argument, proponents cite cases1 9 such
as Alpine Christian Fellowship v. County Commissioners2 and Keeler
v. Mayor of Cumberland.221 In Alpine Christian Fellowship, the
District Court of Colorado applied the compelling state interest test in
the case of a county's rejection of an accessory use of a church as a
private school, and ultimately held that the county lacked a
compelling state interest to deny the permit. 2  With virtually no
analysis under Smith at all, the court found that the code substantially
make 'individualized assessments' of the reasons for certain conduct, those bodies
may not substantially burden a person's free exercise activities without a compelling
interest").
213. Storzer & Picarello, supra note 116, at 949.
214. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
215. See Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 138 ("As was clear even
before Smith made the fact relevant, '[z]oning laws are peculiar in that they are not
really laws of general applicability but are, rather, linked to individual properties'
(quoting Kenneth Pearlman, Zoning and the Location of Religious Establishments, 31
Cath. Law. 314,335 (1988))).
216. Laycock Testimony, May 1999, supra note 70, at 109.
217. Roman P. Storzer, Struggling As Churches With Neighbors: A response to
Marci Hamilton's January 17, 2002 column on FindLaw.com, at
http://www.rluipa.com/media/MarciReply.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).
218. Id.
219. Storzer & Picarello, supra note 116, at 950 & n.141 (citing Keeler v. Mayor of
Cumberland and Alpine Christian Fellowship v. County Comm'rs, and stating that
"[lower courts have recognized the inapplicability of Smith in land use and other free
exercise contexts").
220. 870 F. Supp. 991 (D. Colo. 1994).
221. 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996).
222. Alpine Christian Fellowship, 870 F. Supp. at 994-95.
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burdened the church's free exercise of religion and summarily
concluded that "the appropriate analysis is that suggested by
Sherbert."' The court's lack of analysis in applying the Sherbert
exception suggests a view supporting proponents' argument that the
Smith's "generally applicable" law rule is inapplicable to the land-use
context.
Similarly, in Keeler the District of Maryland held that a landmark
preservation ordinance fell within the Sherbert exception because the
law delineated three situations in which property owners could be
permitted to circumvent historical-landmark status.224  These
objective, secular exceptions were found to constitute a system of
individualized exemptions within the meaning of Smith, and
accordingly the court applied the compelling interest test."1 The court
reasoned that "where the government enacts a system of exemptions,
and thereby acknowledges that its interest in enforcement is not
paramount, then the government 'may not refuse to extend that
system [of exemptions] to cases of 'religious hardship' without
compelling reason."'226 Thus, as in Alpine Christian Fellowship, the
Keeler court read the Sherbert exception broadly enough to include
the zoning ordinance at issue.
Relying on cases such as Keeler and Alpine Christian Fellowship,
the endorsers of RLUIPA argue that a compelling state interest test is
appropriate, under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Smith, whenever
zoning codes involve any system of permits or variances.-' n They
contend that the compelling interest test in the zoning context merely
codifies the Court's free exercise analysis in Smith2,2- despite the fact
that Smith nowhere addressed zoning laws-a point that plays a
central role in the opposition's argument.
2. Opposing Argument: RLUIPA Is a Departure from Smith
For RLUIPA's opponents and several federal circuit courts, the
meaning of the Sherbert exception as defined in Smith is far less broad
223. Id. at 994.
224. Keeler, 940 F. Supp. at 886. Despite the obligation imposed by the general
Historic Preservation Ordinance, the Commission may ignore those mandates where:
(1) The structure is a deterrent to a major improvement program which will
be of substantial benefit to the City of Cumberland; (2) Retention of the
structure would cause undue financial hardship to the owner; or (3) The
retention of the structure would not be to the best interest of a majority of
persons in the community.
Id. (citation omitted).
225. Id.
226. Id. (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 884 (1989)).
227. See supra notes 212-26 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 212-26 and accompanying text.
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than the interpretation which Congress and other proponents have
given it.
In criticizing RLUIPA, Professor Hamilton asserts that "[u]nder
traditional free exercise clause analysis, generally applicable laws such
as zoning laws are subject to very low-level review even when they
affect religious institutions." ' 9 Her reasoning highlights the view that
the Supreme Court did not intend the individualized assessment
context of the Sherbert exception to apply to zoning cases. Rather,
the land-use restrictions are typically generally applicable laws that
fall within the Court's rule in Smith.
Read narrowly, the Sherbert exception could legitimately be
construed as applicable only to the unemployment context.20 If that
were the case, it could be concluded without further analysis that
RLUIPA's imposition of a compelling interest standard in the zoning
context would fly in the face of Smith.
Although declining to interpret the Sherbert exception quite so
narrowly, the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have not extended
the exception to discretionary decisions made in land-use cases. In St.
Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, the Second Circuit
upheld the decision of the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission to deny St. Bartholomew's Church permission to
circumvent the landmark designation of its property.'
In seeking to replace its community house with an office tower, the
Church first applied to the commission pursuant to New York City
Administrative Code Section 25-307 for a "certificate of
appropriateness. ''12 However, the commission denied its application
as well as a second, modified version that proposed a forty-seven-story
tower. 33 A third application sought a certificate of appropriateness
pursuant to the "hardship exception" based on the claim that the
Community House was inadequate to meet the Church's present
needs, but this too was denied.'
The Church sued, claiming that the rejection substantially burdened
its exercise of religion by impairing its "ability to carry on and expand
229. Hamilton, Churches as Neighbors, supra note 175 (emphasis added).
230. Notably, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, does state that the Court
"ha[s] never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test
except the denial of unemployment compensation... [and in] recent years [has]
abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation
field) at all." Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. He also notes that "[elven if [the Court] were
inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation
field, [the Court] would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable
criminal law." Id. at 884 (emphasis added).
231. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir.
1990); see supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
232. St. Bartholomew's Church, 914 F.2d at 351.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 351-52. This application was pursuant to New York City Administrative
Code, sections 207-4.0 and 207-8.0. Id.
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the ministerial and charitable activities that are central to its religious
mission."" Despite the clearly discretionary procedure and system of
individualized assessments, however, the Second Circuit held that
"[t]he Landmarks Law is a facially neutral regulation of general
applicability within the meaning of Supreme Court decisions" and
therefore declined to subject the City to strict scrutiny.'-" Instead, the
court found that the City's application of the law had not
discriminated, in fact or purpose, against the Church, and thus
dismissed its claim. 7
In Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Troy, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the denial of a cemetery association's application to rezone
property located in a single-family residential zone so that the land
could be used as a cemetery.' Ignoring the city planning director's
recommendation to grant the requested permission, both the planning
commission and the city council denied the application for several
reasons.239 Although the permit was discretionary in nature, the Sixth
Circuit found that "the City of Troy's ordinances governing residential
and community facilities [were] neutral laws of general applicability"
and therefore did not fall within the Sherbert exception.-'
The Eighth Circuit's holding in Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of
Hastings provides another example of a narrow interpretation of the
Sherbert exception.241 In Cornerstone, a church sought to relocate to
an old theater located in Hastings's central business district, a C-3
zone from which churches were totally excluded. '  The zoning
ordinance provided for a system of "Uses by Special Permit," for
235. Id. at 353.
236. Id. at 354-55. In so holding, the Second Circuit also acknowledged the quoted
statistic that over fifteen percent of New York City's landmarks are religious
properties. Id. at 354. However, the court did "not understand those facts to
demonstrate a lack of neutrality or general applicability." I. Rather. it recognized
the practical fact that religious buildings were simply very likely to fall within the
Landmarks Law because of their historical and aesthetic significance. Id.
237. Id. at 355-56. Proponents of RLUIPA suggest that the Second Circuit's
"reasoning [in St. Bartholomew's] was simply wrong." Storzer & Picarello, supra note
116, at 951 n.142.
238. Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 400 (6th Cir.
1999).
239. Id. at 402. The City Council gave "six reasons in support of denial:"
(1) insufficient transition or buffer areas proposed... ; (2) reduction of
potential tax base; (3) potential traffic congestion... ; (4) E-P zoning buffer
was a clear circumvention of the intent; (5) it doesn't meet the spirit of the
ordinance; and (6) abuts developed land and is not considered a quasi-public
use.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
240. Id. at 405; cf John M. Smith, Note & Comment, "'Zoned for Residential
Uses"-Like Prayer? Home Worship and Municipal Opposition in LeBlanc-Sternberg
v. Fletcher, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 1153, 1158 (suggesting that because Smith "only
applies to neutral rules of general applicability, it may not even reach land use laws.").
241. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
242- Id. at 467.
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which gas stations, drive-in establishments, creameries, and small
animal clinics, but not churches, were eligible. 43 The city permitted
churches only in residential districts, which comprised forty-five
percent of Hastings.244 Because the city did not intend to regulate
against religious worship, the Eighth Circuit found that the
"ordinance [was] properly viewed as a neutral law of general
applicability" despite the system of secular "special use" exemptions
that was in place.245
Interpretations of this nature place many land-use laws outside the
scope of the Sherbert exception. Under this analysis, RLUIPA
effectively expands the meaning of the Supreme Court's holding in
Smith, exceeding the remedial power granted to Congress by Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 46
The arguments over the factual record of discrimination and the
extent to which Smith applies to land-use regulations set the stage for
Part III's argument that analyzes RLUIPA's deficiencies and sides
with RLUIPA's opponents.
III. RLUIPA's DEFICIENCIES RENDER IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Drawing on the debates set forth in Part II, this part argues that
RLUIPA fails in two major respects. First, Section A shows that
Congress's use of its Section 5, Fourteenth Amendment power was
not remedial, because Congress lacked a sufficient record to
demonstrate a pattern of discrimination. Rather, Congress
unconstitutionally employed its power to create substantive changes
in the Fourteenth Amendment protections. Second, Section B argues
that RLUIPA fails to track the Court's free exercise jurisprudence in
Smith despite its mirror terminology, and therefore fails to observe
the legal limitations on Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.
243. Id. at 466 n.1.
244. Id. at 467.
245. Id. at 472.
246. Relevant to this discussion is the Court's constitutional explanation in City of
Boerne v. Flores that:
[wihen the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the
province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the
law is. When the political branches of the Government act against the
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it
must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat
its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including
stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (citations omitted).
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A. Factual Record Fails to Satisfy the Remedial Standard for Section 5
Power
RLUIPA's most grave constitutional deficiency is its claim to
remedial authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress purports to have strong factual evidence of discrimination
against religions in general, and minority religions in particular, in the
land-use context.247 However, none of the evidence rises to the level
of a "pattern or practice" of discrimination. Nor is RLUIPA tailored
narrowly to target the specific record of discrimination that does exist.
Moreover, even if the evidence on which Congress relied did point to
a pattern, the proffered statistics are themselves flawed.
1. Anecdotal Record Shows No Pattern of Discrimination
The Supreme Court has instructed that "Ithe appropriateness of
[Section 5] remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil
presented."2' However, imposing a compelling state interest test on
zoning boards does not serve to remedy any existing evil because no
systematic discrimination has been shown. Rather, the legislative
record depicts only sporadic conflicts between religious institutions
and zoning boards. Moreover, rational, non-discriminatory reasons
exist that explain why religious groups may be disproportionately
represented in such conflicts.249
Anecdotes presented by RLUIPA's proponents, such as those
detailing the abuse showered on the Refuge by St. Petersburg's zoning
board,20 often actually support the opposition's argument. The
Refuge was a church, which was relabeled a "social services agency"
for zoning purposes, and thus forced to relocate in accordance with
the zoning laws. 1 While Steven McFarland cited the anecdote at a
Congressional hearing as exemplifying discrimination against religious
institutions, he admitted that this case is not part of a broader
practice, stating that although "[o]ther churches in St. Petersburg offer
counseling, concerts, Alcoholics Anonymous, and other forms of
outreach... the zoning officials haven't ordered them to uproot."'25
247. See 146 Cong. Rec. at S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (relying on hearing record in
concluding that "[c]hurches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in
particular, are frequently discriminated against").
248. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
249. See, e.g., supra note 236 (citing the Second Circuit's practical explanation for
why churches may be heavily represented in landmark cases).
250. McFarland Testimony, June 1999, supra note 109, at 4, 7-8; see supra notes
110-15 and accompanying text.
251. McFarland Testimony, June 1999, supra note 109, at 7.
252. Id at 8.
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Rather, "[i]t appears as though the economic poverty of those served
by the Refuge makes all the difference in the world." 3
In so admitting, McFarland refuted what he set out affirmatively to
prove. He showed that even the St. Petersburg zoning board, as
insensitive as it may be, was not engaging in a pattern of religious
discrimination. The board did not seek to uproot the Refuge because
of its religion. Rather, the board seemed to target the Refuge because
the poverty of its clients was interfering with a general effort to "clean
up" the neighborhood. 4  Adverse treatment of churches was
apparently an anomaly even in St. Petersburg where, as McFarland
admitted, the City's many other churches have been left alone. 5
This anecdote suggests that there is no routine discrimination
against religious institutions. Rather, a continual struggle exists
between zoning boards and churches to reach compromises that
account for the interests of all concerned. Under these circumstances,
it is unavoidable that, on some occasions, the interests of religious
organizations will be impossible to accommodate.
The Second Circuit's reasoning in St. Bartholomew's Church sheds
light on why religious institutions may be over-represented in
landmark disputes, which comprise a good portion of the zoning
disputes in which religious institutions are involved. 6 In claiming
that New York's Landmarks Law was neither neutral nor generally
applicable, the Church argued that "of the six hundred landmarked
sites, over fifteen percent are religious properties and over five
percent are Episcopal churches." 7 Rejecting the Church's claim, the
court held that these statistics were not evidence of discrimination at
all. 8 On the contrary, such figures were most likely attributable to
"the importance of religion, and of particular churches, in our social
and cultural history, and [to the fact that] many churches are designed
to be architecturally attractive." 9
Evidence such as Mauck's estimate that thirty percent of the cases
in Chicago's Zoning Appeals Board21 can be countered by reasoning
such as that of the Second Circuit, and the claim that religious
institutions are discriminated against can be rebutted. The aesthetic
characteristics of religious buildings make them inherently more likely
to be landmarked than other kinds of buildings. 6' Moreover, it is
253. Id.
254. Id. at 7.
255. Id. at 8.
256. See supra note 236.




260. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
261. St. Bartholomew's Church. 914 F.2d at 354.
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generally true that churches and similar organizations have greater
financial resources with which to seek legal remedies than individuals.
In fact, religious institutions are often treated preferentially by
zoning boards and local legislators. For instance, the "New York
rule" 2 is generally to accommodate religious land uses more than
secular ones and to prevent the complete exclusion of religious
institutions from residential districts.2 3 Although not applied in every
state, the approach of the New York courts is considered to be the
majority rule in the United States..2  This policy requires zoning
boards to make "every effort to accommodate the religious use [and]
to suggest measures to accommodate the proposed religious use while
mitigating the adverse effects on the surrounding community to the
greatest extent possible. ' 26
Moreover, a 1998 study analyzing accommodation of religion in
areas other than just zoning corroborates this preferential
treatment.2' The National Congregations study surveyed 1236
congregations, achieving a "nationally representative sample."2"'
Based on this study, conclusions have been reached that religious
organizations are generously accommodated in most instances,
including land-use situations, where they seek permission from
government authorities to engage in certain activities.2 '
262. See, e.g., Bright Horizon House, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 469 N.Y.S.2d
851, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (noting that "the general policy, as applied in [New
York], is that religious institutions are virtually immune from zoning restrictions").
263. E.g., Grace Cmty. Church v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 615 A.2d 1092, 1102
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (noting that "other states have held that it is illegal for a
municipality to exclude churches in all zones, from all residential zones"); State v.
Maxwell, 617 P.2d 816, 820 (Haw. 1980) ("The wide majority of courts hold that
religious uses may not be excluded from residential districts."); Milharcic v. Metro.
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 489 N.E.2d 634, 636 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) ("Indiana is in
accord with the majority view that churches may not be lawfully excluded from
residential districts."). Compare the minority, or "California," rule that permits
religious institutions to be excluded from residential districts. E.g., Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jefferson County, 741 F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (N.D. Ala.
1990).
264. See supra note 263.
265. Genesis Assembly of God v. Davies, 617 N.Y.S.2d 202, 203 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (citations omitted): see also Stern Testimony, supra note 124. at 10.
266. Dr. Mark Chaves. Hartford Instit. for Religion Research, The National
Congregations Study, at http://hirr.hartsem.edu/org/faith-.congregations-research-
ncs.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2002).
267. Id.
268. American Atheists, Study Refutes RLPA Claims That Religious Practice Is
"Burdened" by Government Regulations, at http:/www.atheists.org/flash.line
rlpa26.htm (last modified July 31, 1999) (reporting that the National Congregations
study found that "government licensing regulations do not seriously threaten the
practices of faith-based groups seeking permits for church expansion, liquor licenses,
gambling permits and other activities"); see Hamilton, Churches as Neighbors, supra
note 175 (citing the National Congregations study as evidence that religious
institutions are generally treated fairly).
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Finally, a comparison of RLUIPA with its predecessor, RFRA,
shows that the land-use laws cited by RLUIPA fail as evidence of
intentional discrimination under the Court's reasoning in City of
Boerne.269 Just as RFRA's legislative history lacked evidence of
discrimination, so RLUIPA's "legislative record lacks examples of
modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry '270 in the zoning context. Nor does the record
demonstrate that the land-use laws have the effect of discriminating
against religious institutions in general.
In City of Boerne, the City's Historic Landmark Commission
rejected an application for a building permit to enlarge St. Peter
Catholic Church, which was no longer able to accommodate its
growing congregation.271 The Church was located in a landmarked
area, where building was forbidden absent explicit permission.272
Although the Supreme Court focused on RFRA's constitutional
invalidity and did not rule on the merits of the case, its dicta are
pertinent to the question of RLUIPA's validity in the land-use
context.
The Court in City of Boerne reasoned that the "zoning regulations
and historic preservation laws" at issue in the case could not be
considered "examples of legislation enacted or enforced due to
animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices. 273 Nor did the
Court believe that such land-use regulations "indicate[d] some
widespread pattern of religious discrimination. 274
The same zoning laws at issue in City of Boerne are the very "evils"
that Congress sought to remedy by enacting RLUIPA. Although
Congress spent a considerable amount of time during post-Boerne
hearings in an attempt to amass a sufficient record of discrimination, it
has again failed to show that zoning laws are vehicles of
discrimination. There is neither evidence of discriminatory intent nor
a sufficient showing of discriminatory impact. 7' In light of the
minimal evidence of discrimination, it is ironic that Congress chose to
respond to Boerne by challenging the very land-use laws that the
Supreme Court specifically deemed free from "hostility" toward
religious exercise.276
269. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33 (1997).
270. Id. at 530.
271. Id. at 511-12.
272. Id. at 512.
273. Id. at 531.
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 169-200 and accompanying text.
276. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531.
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2. Statistical Evidence of Discrimination Against Minority Religions Is
Deficient
At least two senators found that the evidentiary record depicted "a
widespread pattern of discrimination.., against small and unfamiliar
denominations as compared to larger and more familiar ones."'
Even if the evidence, as presented, were sufficient to amount to a
pattern of discrimination against minority religions, the flawed
assumptions made in compiling the data would cast substantial doubt
on the conclusions that RLUIPA's proponents drew. While it is
difficult to refute whole studies without procuring new data, there are
clear deficiencies in the statistics relied on by Congress.
The Brigham Young University study conducted by Professor
Durham278 is the single most compelling piece of evidence offered
during the congressional hearings on the topic of minority
discrimination and, as such, is cited by many RLUIPA proponents. 9
However, closer examination of the study reveals flaws in its
methodologies and demonstrates that RLUIPA, in fact, lacks a
defensible justification.
The study includes 196 cases involving both zoning board and free
exercise challenges that date back as far as 1921.? '- Professor Durham
collected the cases from three different databases, and thus considers
it "unlikely" that many-if any-relevant cases were missed.," His
methodology in conducting the study was to assume that, in the
absence of discrimination, land-use decisions should impact all
religions in a consistent manner.2'
As shown in Part II, RLUIPA's proponents cite the study as
evidence that minority religions are vastly over-represented in land-
use disputes and that a broad practice of discrimination therefore
exists.' Professor Durham's study classifies a religious group
comprising less than 1.5% of the total adult population as a
"minority" religion, and a group representing more than 1.5% as a
"mainline" or majority religion.? According to his analysis, the
survey reveals that minority religions, which together comprise only
nine percent of the total population, are involved in over forty-nine
percent of the disputes involving the initial construction of religious
277. 146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27. 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
278. Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145. at 131-32, 136, 141-53 (discussing
the Brigham Young study).
279. See supra note 145.
280. Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 141-53 (attached study); see also
Keetch & Richards, supra note 107, at 736.
281. Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 141-53.
282. Keetch & Richards, supra note 107, at 729 (citing Brigham Young study).
283. See supra note 145.
284. Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 142.
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buildings ("Location Cases").' However, two minority religions,
Jehovah's Witnesses and Judaism, together account for 35.2
percentage points of that figure-15.2% and 20.0%, respectively.286
Closer examination reveals that the inclusion of these two groups in
the minority category is misleading and substantially skews the data.
The Jehovah's Witness group comprises 0.8% of the general adult
population and 15.2% of the Location Cases, which presents a striking
disparity.' However, eleven of the nineteen Location Cases
involving Jehovah's Witnesses occurred in the 1950s and three in the
early 1960s.1 Thus, almost three-quarters of the Jehovah's Witness
cases used in the Brigham Young study took place forty or more years
ago. 9 Of the remaining five cases, two occurred in the 1970s and
three in the 1980s.21  Zero land-use cases from the 1990s involve the
Jehovah's Witnesses.291 Scrutinized in this way, the figures suggest
either a decade of discrimination in the 1950s or a sharp drop in
discrimination after that period. Alternatively, they could indicate a
significant rise in the number of Jehovah's Witnesses seeking to build
churches between 1950 and 1964. Whatever the reason, these cases
demonstrate little about the status of Jehovah's Witnesses in land-use
disputes during the past thirty years and therefore cannot be used to
prove that religious land-use discrimination is rampant today.29
A focused examination of the Judaism group is equally revealing.
Also designated as a minority denomination by Professor Durham,
the Judaism group represents 2.2% of the general population and a
surprising 20.0% of the Location Cases. 2 93  However, the
categorization of Judaism as a minority religion is problematic on
several levels.
Durham's own scaling system places any religious group consisting
of over 1.5% of the adult population in the majority religion category,
with the notable exception of Judaism. According to his system, the
Judaism group consists of 2.2% of the general population but is still
classified as minority.294 Professor Durham attempts to justify this
anomaly by explaining that, if "Judaism were divided to reflect the
major branches of that tradition, the various branches would come
285. Id. at 143 (Table 1 of study).
286. Id.
287. Id.




292. Significantly, the Supreme Court criticized Congress's enactment of RFRA for
the fact that the "legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of generally
applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry." City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
293. Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145, at 143.
294. Id.
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under the 1.5[%] threshold."295  While this calculation may be
accurate, its effect is misleading. A more objective analysis would
include Judaism in the study's majority religion category, which would
have reduced by twenty percentage points the proportion of Location
Cases in which minority religions were involved and rendered the
conclusions about minority discrimination substantially less
persuasive.
No less significant is the fact that twenty-three of the thirty-eight
Location Cases involving Judaism occurred in California, Florida,
New Jersey, and New York,2 96 where the Jewish population is
disproportionately represented, as compared with the rest of the
United States.297  Over sixty percent of the total U.S. Jewish
population resides in these four states alone.2 '  In California, Jewish
persons comprise 2.9% of the total population (as of 1999); in Florida,
4.2%; in New Jersey, 5.7%; and in New York, 9.1%.2 These
percentages are substantially higher than Professor Durham's 2.2% of
the total population,' and presumably are higher still in the urban
areas where the Jewish population tends to cluster. Thus, Judaism
falls squarely into Durham's majority religion category in California,
Florida, New Jersey, and New York, the states where Jewish persons
are most heavily concentrated in this country."
Indeed, Professor Durham's whole system of categorization is
called into question when one considers that many minority religious
groups tend to cluster geographically. Because zoning decisions are
made on a local level and take into account neighborhood concerns, it
is misleading to allocate minority status based on the percentage of
the total U.S. population. This is especially true in the case of
Judaism, which does not fit within the minority category even under
Professor Durham's own assumptions.
Without the classification of Judaism and Jehovah's Witnesses as
minority denominations, the remaining eleven religions in that
category account for 5.8% of the total adult population and only
14.4% of the Location Cases.3" This discrepancy is far less severe
than the 9-out-of-49 ratio proffered by the authors of the study and
continually reiterated by RLUIPA's proponents.-"3 Moreover, to
295. Id at 142.
296. Id. at 147-53 (list of cases used in the study).




300. See Durham Testimony, 1998, supra note 145. at 143.
301. See id at 142.
302. See id. at 143 (Table 1).
303. See id at 136. Further note that excluding Judaism and Jehovah's Witnesses
from the "minority" categorization also reduces the proportion of minority religions
represented in Accessory Use cases (i.e., those cases where a religious institution
seeks to expand an already-existing building or the activities occurring therein). See
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normalize the ratio, one must consider that while minority religions
account for 5.8% of the total population, they account for 6.8% of the
total adult religious population, which reduces the ratio still further.3°
Non-discriminatory factors could easily explain a discrepancy of this
size, such as the fact that small, new religions may well be growing at a
more rapid rate than larger, more established ones.
This analysis reveals that the Brigham Young study is not as
persuasive as the quoted statistics and summary conclusions claiming
discrimination initially suggest. While minority religions are
somewhat over-represented and may be subject to occasional
discrimination in the land-use context, the study does not support the
conclusion that there is a nationwide practice of discrimination against
minority religious groups.
3. RLUIPA Lacks Congruence to the Factual Record
In addition to lacking an evidentiary record of discrimination,
RLUIPA also fails the proportionality test established by the
Supreme Court for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.305
In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end." 36  Without such
congruence, "legislation may become substantive in operation and
effect" and fail to be remedial as the Fourteenth Amendment
requires. 37 This is true whether the legislation is designed to remedy
or to prevent constitutional violations.3 " Because Congress sought to
create "preventive" legislation in enacting RLUIPA,3 9 it is necessary
to consider the impact of imposing a compelling governmental interest
test on zoning boards in order to determine whether RLUIPA
id. at 143 (Table 1). Instead of 34.0% of the Accessory Use cases, the remaining
eleven minority religions account for only 15.5% of the cases. See id.
304. See id.
305. See supra notes 169-200 and accompanying text.
306. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997).
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. 146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). In explaining the basis of its power to enact
RLUIPA under the Fourteenth Amendment, Senators Hatch and Kennedy reasoned
that, under City of Boerne, "Congress may act to enforce the Constitution when it has
'reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the congressional enactment have
a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional."' Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521
U.S. at 532). Where there is such a "likelihood," the Court has stated that
"preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures." City of Boerne, 521
U.S. at 530. In the opinion of Senators Hatch and Kennedy, Congress has satisfied
this standard. 146 Cong. Rec. S7775. However, land-use laws are not likely to be
unconstitutional because there is no persuasive evidence that such regulations are
being used systematically to discriminate against religious institutions. See supra Part
III.A.1-2.
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constitutes a suitable and congruent "means."3"' The compelling
interest test entails two extremely stringent requirements: first, the
government's stated interest must be "compelling"; and second, the
law must be the "least restrictive means" to achieve that interest."
The Court in City of Boerne stated that the compelling state interest
test is "the most demanding test known to constitutional law." '  As
Professor Laycock has acknowledged, only a narrow set of
governmental interests in the land-use context actually qualifies as
"compelling."313 The Court in Smith also expressed concern that "if
'compelling interest' really means what it says (and watering it
down... would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is
applied), many laws will not meet the test."3"' Whereas fire codes and
safety regulations will usually satisfy the compelling standard, run-of-
the-mill land-use concerns such as traffic, noise, decreased land-value,
and plot-size will not.1 5 Thus, if a compelling interest standard were
imposed on zoning boards, the state would have very little, if any,
room to maneuver in conflicts with religious institutions.-" Indeed,
because land-use interests, by their very nature, rarely rise to the level
of compelling, the imposition of a compelling interest standard lacks
proportion to a reasonable end.
Of course, the compelling interest standard is not imposed
automatically on zoning boards under RLUIPA. A religious
310. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
311. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, § 2(a)(1)(A)-
(B), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2001).
312 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
313. See Laycock, State RFRAs, supra note 155, at 766.
314. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888
(1990).
315. Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Use
After Boerne, 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 861, 919 (200) (citing Laycock, State RFRAs,
supra note 155, at 766); see also Soc'y of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks
Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Mass. 1990) (noting that "[t]he government interest in
historic preservation, though worthy, is not sufficiently compelling to justify restraints
on the free exercise of religion"); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d
174, 185 (Wash. 1992) (finding that the government's "interest in preservation of
esthetic and historic structures is not compelling"); Thomas Pak, Free Erercise, Free
Expression and Landmarks Preservation, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1813, 1845 (1991) (stating
that "[a]lthough the goals of landmarks preservation are valid state interests.., they
do not rise to the level of more traditional justifications for compelling state
interests").
316. See Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Conn. 2001). In this
recent RLUIPA case, the District of Connecticut found that a Connecticut zoning
board had a sufficiently compelling reason to impose a cease-and-desist order on a
prayer group that was meeting in a single-family home because cars crowded into the
end of a cul-de-sac could create safety problems for members of the group as well as
for their neighbors. Id. at 178-79. The court found that health and safety concerns
were "compelling," whereas "aesthetics and traffic safety" usually fail to rise to that
level. Id. at 190 (citations omitted). However, in the end, the court struck down the
zoning board's restriction for its failure to be the "'least restrictive means' of
protecting the health and safety of their community." Id.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
institution must first demonstrate that its exercise of religion has been
substantially burdened.317 However, RLUIPA defines "religious
exercise" broadly to ensure that zoning and landmark disputes are
encompassed-arguably more broadly than the Supreme Court's
interpretation allows.318 Under RLUIPA's expansive definition,
"[r]eligious exercise" includes "[t]he use, building, or conversion of
real property for the purpose of religious exercise. "319
In contrast to religious exercise, "substantial burden" is not defined
in the text of RLUIPA. Recently, the District of Connecticut
addressed what Congress intended by this terminology in the context
of RLUIPA. In Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n, the court held under
RLUIPA that a cease-and-desist order substantially burdened the
"religious exercise" of a prayer group that held meetings in a single-
family house at the end of a cul-de-sac on Sunday afternoons and thus
violated zoning requirements.310 The town's cease-and-desist order
required that plaintiffs' meetings not exceed twenty-five attendees.3 2'
However, the court found that the order was a "substantial burden"
because "[t]o require plaintiffs to turn people away whom plaintiffs
believe can and should be helped by the group's prayer forces them to
modify their religious practices. '' 322 However, the court recognized
that this seemed to be an expansive definition of religious exercise and
thus of substantial burden as well. 323
Based on the record of alleged discrimination motivating the
enactment of RLUIPA, Congress likely concluded that many zoning
and landmark laws imposed substantial and unreasonable burdens on
religious exercise. If Congress had not considered such zoning
regulations to burden religious exercise, then its use of Section 5
power would be unwarranted, and RLUIPA itself would be
unnecessary. According to Congress's reasoning, therefore, denying
special permits to religious institutions that seek to build or expand
constitutes a substantial burden and thus should be subject to the
317. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, § 2(a)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2001).
318. See, e.g., Murphy, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (noting that "by not limiting the
scope of [RLUIPA's] protections to the exercise of religious beliefs compelled by or
central to a particular faith, Congress now requires that some of the language used by
the Supreme Court in discussing 'substantial burden[sJ' be applied in a broader
context"). The court further noted that RLUIPA's definition of "religious exercise"
potentially expands the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence despite
Congress's "expressed... intent not to change this definition." Id. Note that this
potential expansion is yet another possible weakness in RLUIPA.
319. RLUIPA, § (8)(7)(B).
320. Murphy, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See supra note 318.
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compelling governmental interest test. If subjected to a standard of
such stringency, zoning boards will seldom prevail.
Moreover, a comparison with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
the Supreme Court upheld as a valid use of Section 5 power,
demonstrates RLUIPA's relative lack of proportionality to the ends
sought to be achieved.32- For instance, in enacting RLUIPA, Congress
failed to target specific geographical areas or land-use contexts where
the alleged discrimination against religious land-use was particularly
severe. Instead of analyzing the discrimination on a region-by-region
basis, Congress imposed the compelling interest standard
nationwide.3 26  Nor did Congress impose a "termination date or
termination mechanism,"327 which is often appropriate in cases of
remedial legislation.
Therefore, it appears that by its enactment of RLUIPA Congress
intended to equip religious institutions with a powerful weapon.
Congress evidently also envisioned a drastic goal-that zoning boards
should rarely prevail in land-use disputes with religious organizations.
In this sense, the "means"-RLUIPA's compelling interest test-are
congruent to those "ends" that Congress sought to achieve. But these
very ends are themselves highly disproportionate to any evidence of
discrimination. They neither remedy past discrimination (for the
record does not support such a finding), nor aim in any reasonable
way to prevent future discrimination. Rather, these ends represent a
substantive interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause-", that goes
beyond any reasonable use of Congress's Section 5 power under the
Supreme Court's remedial definition.
B. RLUIPA Is Legally Invalid Under Smith
While Congress's factual record clearly fails to meet the necessary
"pattern or practice" standard, RLUIPA's legal validity under the
Smith doctrine is somewhat less clear-cut. The Supreme Court has
never specifically addressed to what extent zoning laws that involve
individualized assessments should be considered generally applicable
within the meaning of Smith. 2 9 However, at least some of the zoning
324. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); see supra notes 314-16.
325. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
326. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, where the measures designed to combat
racial voting discrimination were limited to those areas of the country in which such
discrimination was heavily documented. 383 U.S. at 315.
327. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. 532 (1993); see also id. at 518 (citing
cases where Congress successfully invoked its Section 5. Fourteenth Amendment
power and many of which involved a termination date).
328. Indeed, zoning laws "valid under Smith would fall under [RLUIPAJ without
regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise." Id. at
534; see also infra Part III.B.
329. Indeed, the Court has never defined exactly what "generally applicable"
means. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
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laws encompassed by RLUIPA are generally applicable despite the
presence of individualized assessments, and therefore should not be
subject to a compelling interest standard. For this reason, RLUIPA
fails to codify the Court's free exercise jurisprudence and instead
unconstitutionally broadens it.
Although "neutral" and "generally applicable" have never been
precisely defined, the Court's central inquiry focuses on whether
"prohibiting the exercise of religion... is... the object of the [law or]
merely the incidental effect."33 Because zoning laws do not target
religion, the precise definitions of "neutral" and "generally
applicable" need not be ascertained for the purposes of assessing
RLUIPA's constitutionality. Moreover, the Court has stated that the
terms "neutral" and "general applicability" are "interrelated," and
"failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other
has not been satisfied.""33  Furthermore, Justice Scalia considers it
unnecessary "to make a clear distinction between the two terms" at all
because they "substantially overlap. 332
To distinguish zoning laws from generally applicable laws in
enacting RLUIPA, Congress apparently focused on Smith's language
that defined Sherbert as involving "a system of exemptions" and
"individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the
relevant conduct. 3 33 However, in limiting RLUIPA to land-use cases
involving "individualized assessments, ' 3 4 Congress altered Smith's
terminology as well as the underlying concepts on which the Court's
free exercise jurisprudence has relied. Indeed, RLUIPA imposes the
compelling interest test on zoning boards whenever the "government
makes.., individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the
property involved," '335 rather than "individualized... assessment of
the reasons for the relevant conduct" under Smith.336 In altering
"reasons for the relevant conduct" to "uses for the property" involved
in the text of RLUIPA, Congress substantially broadened the Sherbert
exception.
According to the language of Smith, the Sherbert exception is
triggered where the government assesses an applicant's motivation in
seeking a legal exception. For example, in Sherbert, South Carolina
deemed unemployment applicants ineligible for benefits where they
543 (1993) (noting that the Court "need not define with precision the standard used to
evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application").
330. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878
(1990).
331. Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 531.
332. Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring).
333. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
334. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, § 2(a)(2)(C), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2001).
335. Id. (emphasis added).
336. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added).
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had refused work without "good cause."337 While permitting a series
of secular excuses to qualify as good cause, South Carolina denied
good cause status to the applicant's refusal to work on Saturday, the
Sabbath for Seventh-Day Adventists.' -'  The good cause inquiry
involved assessing the reasons for the applicant's refusal to work,3
and the Court in Sherbert held that, absent a compelling state interest,
South Carolina could not deny the exemption for religious reasons
while granting it for secular ones-'-
Moreover, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, the Court found that a law prohibiting the sacrificial killing
of animals was not generally applicable because the law effectively
prohibited only killing for religious reasons.-" Instead of prohibiting
all killing of animals, the ordinance exempted secular reasons for
killing animals while specifically targeting killing by members of the
Santerian religion.' The asserted interests against cruelty to animals
and in promoting public health "were pursued only with respect to
conduct motivated by religious beliefs." - 3 Just as the law in Sherbert
permitted South Carolina to assess the reasons for denying work on a
case-by-case basis, so too the prohibition and its many exemptions in
Lukumi reflected a legislative assessment of the motives for killing
animals that discriminated against religious reasons for so doing.-
In contrast to the unemployment law at issue in Sherbert and the
ordinance in Lukumi, zoning decisions do not usually involve any
inquiry into the reasons for applicants' wishing to build or expand.
Zoning boards do not typically grant or deny permits based on
religious versus secular reasons for building.-" Rather, they
traditionally take into account the type of building sought to be
constructed, or the "proposed uses" of the property, in order to assess
the potential impact on, and compatibility with, the surrounding
environs.34 Therefore, in shifting from the assessment of "reasons,"
as in Smith, to the assessment of "uses," RLUIPA substantially
increases the number and variety of instances where the compelling
interest test would affect zoning boards. In so doing, RLUIPA
diverges from the Court's free exercise jurisprudence.
337. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,400-01 (1963).
338. Id. at 399-401.
339. See id2 at 401.
340. See id. at 406.
341. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 544-46 (1992).
342. Id. For example, the prohibition exempts the killing of animals for use as
food. Id. at 535-37.
343. Id. at 524 (six Justices joined this portion of the opinion).
344. Id.
345. The lack of any significant factual or statistical evidence indicating land-use
discrimination against religious institutions corroborates the validity of this
presumption. See supra Part III.A.
346. See supra Part III.A.
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Significantly, the Court in Smith cites the traffic law in Cox v. New
Hampshire 7 as exemplifying a law that is generally applicable despite
requiring a permit and board-assessment of the proposed uses. 48 In
Cox, the challenged law was a state statute that prohibited "a 'parade
or procession' upon a public street without a special license." 349
Notably, the statute provided for a "[l]icensing [b]oard" which "shall
have delegated powers to investigate and decide the question of
granting licenses."35
While lacking "unfettered discretion," the licensing board in Cox
had a duty to investigate whether "the convenience of the public in
the use of the streets would... thereby be unduly disturbed" and to
consider "time, place and manner in relation to the other proper uses
of the streets."351  This function closely resembles that of zoning
boards, although land-use decisions require more in-depth
consideration of the proposed uses because their impact is usually
longer-lasting. Neither type of law involves assessing the reasons
behind the seeking of a permit, as was true of the unemployment
benefits law in Sherbert.
The Court's citation of Cox in its discussion of general applicability
highlights its intention that not every law involving any kind of
individualized assessment should be subject to the compelling interest
test. On the contrary, the Court considered the traffic law in Cox to
be generally applicable despite its system of individualized
assessments, and specifically held that religious exemptions from laws
of that kind were not "constitutionally required. '35 2 The similarity in
procedure between land-use regulations and the traffic law in Cox
strongly suggests that the former are also generally applicable despite
347. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
348. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889
(1990). In Smith, the Court gives examples of "general laws" from which religious
exemptions would be inappropriate and certainly are not "constitutionally required."
Id. at 888-89 & n.5. It criticizes the proposal that every law burdening religious
exercise should be required to satisfy a "compelling state interest" because such an
approach would create:
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic
obligations of almost every conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory
military service to the payment of taxes; to health and safety regulation such
as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug
laws, and traffic laws; to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage
laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws,
and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races. The First
Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not require this.
Id. at 888-89 (citations omitted).
349. Cox, 312 U.S. at 570-71.
350. Id. at 571 n.1 (quotations omitted).
351. Id. at 576 (citations omitted).
352. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89.
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their system of individualized assessments and thus that they do not fit
within the Sherbert exception. 3 '
This limited view of the Court's Sherbert exception as inapplicable
to most zoning laws is consistent with the Court's use of the terms
"generally applicable" and "neutral" to define laws that do not
specifically discriminate against religious reasons for certain behavior.
Indeed, according to the Court in Lukumi, "[t]he principle that
government... cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on
conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of
the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause."'-'
In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court contrasted the concept of
"deliberate persecution" with "laws of general applicability [that]
place incidental burdens on religion."3" Moreover, the Court
specifically identified "zoning regulations and historic preservation
laws... which as an incident of their normal operation, have adverse
effects on churches and synagogues. ' -- In so doing, the Court itself
included within the generally applicable law category typical land-use
regulations, such as the landmark law at issue in City of Boerne, which
involve discretionary, individualized assessments.
Thus, although land-use laws that involve variances and special
permits do, by their very nature, involve individualized assessments of
one kind, they are not the same individualized assessments as are
discussed in Smith. Accordingly, land-use regulations do not fall
within the Sherbert exception to the Smith rule. Moreover,
RLUIPA's subjection of all land-use regulations "under which a
government makes... individualized assessments of the proposed
uses for the property involved"'3- to a compelling interest standard
fails to track the Court's holding in Smith. On the contrary, RLUIPA
substantially expands it.
CONCLUSION
The recent enactment of RLIUPA is not a valid use of Congress's
Section 5, Fourteenth Amendment power for two closely related
reasons. The record upon which Congress relied in enacting RLUIPA
failed to demonstrate that land-use regulations consistently suppress,
353. This reasoning is also consistent with that of the Second Circuit in St.
Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348,355 (2d Cir. 1990), the Sixth
Circuit in Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1999),
and the Eighth Circuit in Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464
(8th Cir. 1991). See supra notes 231-45 and accompanying text.
354. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543
(1993).
355. City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507,530 (1997).
356. Id. at 531.
357. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. § 2(a)(2)(C), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2001).
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or are designed to suppress, the exercise of religion .3 8 Rather,
decisions in the land-use context are made on a highly case-specific
basis, and take into account a myriad of conflicting interests. Many of
these interests are not "compelling" by any traditional definition,359
and therefore RLUIPA's imposition of a compelling governmental
interest standard lacks proportion to any reasonable end. Instead of
remedying constitutional violations or preventing potential violations,
Congress has created new, substantive protections beyond those
required by the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence.
Despite Congress's apparent effort to track the Court's decision in
Smith by using the "individualized assessment" terminology of the
Sherbert exception, RLUIPA expands the Court's analysis. Although
some of the Court's definitions and concepts have not yet been
elucidated, RLUIPA clearly extends to religious institutions
protections that exceed the intended boundaries. In creating
substantive protections, Congress has exceeded any remedial use of its
Fourteenth Amendment power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause.
Because these deficiencies are substantial, the Supreme Court will
likely invalidate those portions of RLUIPA that are based on
Fourteenth Amendment power, just as it struck down RFRA in City
of Boerne.
358. See supra Part III.A.
359. See supra notes 312-16 and accompanying text.
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